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INTRODUCTION
United States citizens have been electing their president for over
two hundred years. Political parties have supported rival national
tickets since 1796. Despite this long tradition, there is still a great
deal of uncertainty about the legal and constitutional status of the
presidential nomination process. This Article discusses the key legal
principles involved in presidential nomination litigation and sug-
gests an approach emphasizing the First Amendment associational
rights of political parties while respecting the rights of candidates,
voters, and party members.
The process by which the two major parties nominate their
presidential candidates is crucial to the operation of our democracy.
No president has been elected without receiving the nomination of
either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party since 1848,
when the voters chose Zachary Taylor of the Whig Party.' No
independent or third party presidential candidate has received as
much as twenty percent of the popular vote since former President
Theodore Roosevelt garnered 27.39 percent in 1912 running under
' CONG, ISONAL QuARTmEY, GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 332-66 (2nd ed. 1985).
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the Progressive (Bull Moose) banner.2 The presidential nomination
process has often led to litigation, including three U.S. Supreme
Court opinions.3 Yet several crucial legal issues remain unresolved,
including the extent to which intra-party disputes are non-justicia-
ble "political questions," the extent to which the nomination proc-
ess is state action, and the extent to which the parties' associational
rights give them immunity from state and federal legislation. This
uncertainty is disturbing given the importance of presidential nom-
inations.
Part I of this Article reviews the history of presidential nomi-
nations, 4 while Part II briefly surveys the substantive grounds for
legal challenges to the nomination process.5 Part II also discusses
three procedural issues that have often arisen in presidential nom-
ination litigation: the proper parties, timing, and justiciability. 6
The Article concludes that questions relating to the proper parties
pose only minor difficulties. Timing is a more serious problem
since political disputes often become moot before a final decision
on the merits is possible. The justiciability issue poses the greatest
difficulties. The political question doctrine has not been applied
consistently to presidential nominations and its use in this context
finds little or no support in Supreme Court decisions. This Article
will argue that intra-party disputes are not "political questions"
and the courts' reluctance to intervene in party affairs should be
based on respect for the parties' associational rights and not from
any supposed inability to decide cases arising from partisan political
disputes.
Finally, and most importantly, this Article addresses the ques-
tion of the constitutional status of national conventions and the
delegate selection process. 7 First, it will trace the development of
the parties' associational rights. This analysis concludes that the
parties are virtually immune from state regulation of presidential
nominations and that most federal regulation, apart from regula-
tion of campaign contributions, would be found unconstitutional.
This constitutional immunity has a significant exception-invidious
2 Id. at 348-66.
1 Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Brown v. O'Brien, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
4 See infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 44-105 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 106-218 and accompanying text.
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racial and sexual discrimination by the major parties receives less
constitutional protection.
This Article will then examine the question of whether presi-
dential nominations constitute state action.8 In the author's opin-
ion, recognition of the parties associational rights indicates clearly
that the nomination process is not a public function. In addition,
other grounds often asserted (including governmental regulation of
the nomination process, federal funding of conventions and nom-
ination campaigns, and the provision of preferential ballot access
to party nominees) do not justify a finding of state action.
These themes are tied together in a final section,9 which argues
that inconsistencies and uncertainties in the case law concerning
justiciability and state action can be resolved by using the parties'
associational rights as the starting point for legal analysis. If the
presidential nomination process is treated as a protected exercise
of the right to association, then clearly this process is not state
action except where state decisions themselves are challenged (e.g.,
in challenges to statutes governing presidential primaries). Simi-
larly, by beginning the analysis with the parties' associational rights,
it becomes apparent that there is no need to invoke the political
question doctrine. This is important because courts should be free
to decide intra-party disputes where associational rights are not
threatened.
This analysis by no means disposes of all the thorny questions
that can arise in presidential nomination litigation, but it does
simplify some difficult threshold issues and it is fully consistent
with all relevant Supreme Court decisions. The author expects the
law to develop along the lines suggested in this Article because the
increasing recognition of associational rights in recent years makes
such development inevitable.
I. BRmF HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS
The U.S. Constitution makes no reference to political parties.
Indeed, James Madison, perhaps the most brilliant and articulate
advocate of the Constitution, believed that "the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties," 10 and that one of the
new charter's greatest virtues was its potential for "curing the
See infra notes 219-381 and accompanying text.
See infra note 382 and accompanying text.
tO Tim FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (J. Madison) (Dunne ed. 1901).
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mischiefs of faction."'" Whatever the hopes of the framers might
have been, national political parties emerged within the first few
years of the new republic.
Regular partisan nomination procedures first appeared in 1800,
when both the Federalist Party and the Democratic-Republican
Party (ancestor of the modern Democratic Party) chose their pres-
idential and vice-presidential candidates through a caucus of party
members in Congress.12 This system remained in effect until 1816.
Presidential nominations then became decentralized, with each state
holding caucuses or conventions. The election of 1832 saw the
emergence of national party conventions, with delegates appor-
tioned to the states by electoral vote.' 3 These delegates were chosen
by local caucuses that were often controlled by party bosses. 14
The next major development in presidential nominations was
the introduction of the primary election. The primary election was
a Progressive Era reform-its most important advocate was Gov.
Robert LaFollette in Wisconsin.' 5 The primary was intended to
reduce the influence of party leaders. 16 By 1912, presidential pri-
mary elections were used to select delegates to the national party
convention in twelve states. 17 All modern primaries are governed
by state election laws. Some presidential primaries elect delegates
by district, others by proportional representation, and still others
on a winner-take-all basis.' 8 Some states hold primaries with no
binding effect at all-the so-called "beauty contest."' 19
The last twenty years have seen a flurry of reform in presiden-
tial nominations. Elaborate party rules were devised, and state
party organizations that refused to follow them have found their
delegations rejected by the Credentials Committees 20 at the national
" Id. at 63.
M. OsTROrORSK, DEMOCRACY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 13-15
(F. Clarke trans. 1902). CONGREssiONAL QuARTERLY, supra note 1, at 9; Cousins, 419 U.S.
at 490 n.9.
" 0STROGORSIC, supra note 12, at 59-64.
14 Id. at 65.
" CoNoREssIoNAL QuARTERLY, supra note 1, at 379.
16 Id.; cf. Geary v. Renne, 880 F.2d 1062, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Pro-
gressive Era reforms in California).
J.W. DAvis, PRESIDENTIAL PRnmEs: ROAD TO THE WHn-E HousE 43 (1980).
's CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 1, at 381.
19 Id.
0 In 1964 and 1968, all-white Democratic delegations from southern states were
successfully challenged by integrated states. CONGREssIoNAL QUARTERLY, INC., NATIONAL
PARTY CONVENTIONS 1831-1972, 85, 109 (1983). See also Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex
rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
1989-90]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
convention. These rules have regularized the procedure in caucus
states, and now state conventions often reflect selections made in
open county or precinct caucuses. 21 Another significant develop-
ment has been the increase in the number of presidential primaries.
By 1980, thirty-seven jurisdictions held presidential primaries al-
though the number has declined somewhat since then. 2 All in all,
national nomination procedures have come to look like a quasi-
democratic elective process-it is no surprise that constitutional
and statutory challenges to the process have increased in recent
decades.
II. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES INVOLVED IN
CHALLENGES TO PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCEDURES
A. Substantive Grounds for Challenging Party Actions
Legal challenges to the presidential nomination process have
involved a wide variety of theories. The challengers' theories fall
into three basic categories: constitutional challenges, statutory chal-
lenges, and challenges based on party rules. This section of the
Article surveys the three categories and outlines the major limita-
tions on each type of challenge.
1. Constitutional Challenges
Challenges have often attacked the nomination process on con-
stitutional grounds. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment has been used to attack racial discrimination in non-
presidential primary elections in several historic decisions.2 In re-
cent years, gender discrimination has emerged as another basis for
equal protection challenges.24 The parties' efforts to achieve affirm-
ative action goals may lead to additional challenges claiming reverse
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 382.
Id. at 380-81.
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 769 (1944).
14 See Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191 (1979) (challenge to gender quotas in
composition of state party committee); Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l Party, 836 F.2d 837
(4th Cir. 1987) (challenge to gender quotas for election of delegates to 1984 national
convention).
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discrimination.Y Finally, there have been many efforts to challenge
the nomination procedures based on the principle of one person,
one vote.
26
Equal protection is only one potential constitutional argument.
Challengers have also cited constitutional protections of free
speech, 27 freedom of the press, the right to vote, group and indi-
vidual associational rights, 28 and due process. 29 Future constitu-
tional arguments may be based on freedom of religion and the
establishment clause.3 0 Of these, a due process challenge to internal
party proceedings is potentially the most powerful, if such a chal-
lenge is permissible.
The obvious limitation on these theories is that these constitu-
tional protections require a finding of state action. As recently as
the early 1970's, federal courts routinely found that virtually every
aspect of the party's presidential nomination process was state
action." As we shall see, however, these holdings are no longer
viable and future constitutional attacks could be limited solely to
government-mandated procedures such as primary elections and
federal financing of presidential nomination campaigns.
25 See Marchioro, 442 U.S. 191; Bachur, 825 F.2d 837; Ricard v. State of Louisiana,
544 So. 2d 1310 (La. App. 1989); see also Charter of the Democratic Party of the United
States (adopted in 1988, for use until 1992), which requires 50% of delegates be women
(art. II, sec. 4) and provides for setting specific goals for minority participation (art. X,
sec. 3). Rules of the Republican Party (adopted in 1988 for use until 1992) require numer-
ically equal representation of both genders in the office of vice chairman of the Republican
National Committee (Rule 23(a)(2)) and on convention committees (Rule 17(a)).
See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wymbs v. Republican State Exec.
Comm., 719 F.2d 1072 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984); Montano v.
Lefkowitz, 575 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1978); Ripon Soc'y v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d
567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976); Seergy v. Kings County
Republican Cent. Comm., 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972); Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968); Heitmanis v. Austin, 677 F. Supp. 1347, 1357 n.7
(E.D. Mich. 1988); Dahl v. Republican State Comm., 319 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Wash. 1979);
Hunt v. Democratic Party, 439 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Okla. 1977); Doty v. Montana State
Democratic Cent. Comm., 333 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mont. 1971).
27 See Kay v. New Hampshire Democratic Party, 821 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1987); Heit-
manis, 677 F. Supp. at 1357 n.7.
See Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. 1347.
' See Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 567-70 (D.C. Cir. 1972), stayed 409 U.S. 1
(1972), vacated 409 U.S. 816 (1972).
3 For example, if a party attempted to restrict membership on the basis of religion
or passed a resolution, as the Arizona Republican Party recently did, declaring that the
U.S. is a Christian nation, then such arguments might be made effectively.
11 See Brown, 469 F.2d at 567; Bode v. Nat'l Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1304-
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972); Georgia v. Nat'l Democratic
Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Doty, 333
F. Supp. at 51.
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2. Statutory Challenges
The second category of challenge is the statutory challenge.
There are several federal statutes that directly regulate presidential
nominations. The Voting Rights Act 32 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race or color in state elections. It requires "preclear-
ance" of any changes in election laws in certain jurisdictions. The
statute has been construed to require preclearance of rules for the
election of delegates to national conventions in states subject to
preclearance.3 3 Because the Voting Rights Act has been an increas-
ingly popular basis for litigation in recent years, 34 there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that it will be used to challenge delegate selection
systems in-the future.
The Federal Election Campaign Act 35 regulates the financing
of presidential campaigns. The statute defines the term "election"
to include "a convention or caucus of a political party which has
authority to nominate a candidate. 31 6 However, because the Act is
concerned chiefly with the financial practices of election campaigns,
it probably could not be used to challenge the delegate selection
process or the conduct of a national convention.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act 37 provides match-
ing funds for presidential campaigns. Because it provides greater
funding to the nominees of the major parties,3 8 a dispute could
arise as to which candidate was the official party nominee if the
convention split or if its result was subject to challenge. The Act
specifically provides for judicial review.3 1
State election laws governing presidential primary elections or
delegate selection have also led to legal challenges to party actions.
Challengers have typically invoked state laws governing delegate
selection or presidential primaries. 4°
The future of statutory challenges to presidential nominations
like the future of constitutional challenges is questionable. In a
series of cases over the last fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court
has granted political parties greater immunity from statutory res-
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1982).
13 MacGuire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119, 121 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
'4 See Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. at 1357 n.7.
3' 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1982).
36 2 U.S.C. § 431(I)(b).
37 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1982).
38 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a).
39 26 U.S.C. § 9011.
0 See, e.g., Cousins, supra note 3; LaFollette, supra note 3.
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trictions based on the parties' constitutional right to freedom of
association. 41 As we shall see, this freedom is not absolute, but it
is clear that statutory restrictions impinging on the rights of polit-
ical association must be justified by a compelling state interest in
order to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
3. Party Rules
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has recognized that
political parties are entitled to a certain degree of autonomy be-
cause they have associational rights under the Constitution. The
corollary to the greater respect given to party rules is that the rules
themselves have become the basis for legal challenges. 42 Legal
challenges alleging violations of party rules have been rare to date,
but are likely to become more common as other types of challenges
become less available due to associational rights concerns.
Like the other types of challenges, a challenge based on party
rules faces a fundamental obstacle. Courts have frequently refused
to rule on intra-party disputes involving presidential nominations
on the ground that such disputes are non-justiciable political ques-
tions .43
In this writer's view, the courts that have adopted the approach
that such disputes are non-justiciable have erred. If the courts are
to follow a hands-off policy, it should be based on the parties'
associational rights and not on the basis of an inconsistent policy
of deciding some, but not all, cases arising from political disputes.
The justiciability/political question issue may be with us for some
time, however, since some recent lower court precedents support it
and the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively.
B. Procedural Issues
1. Proper Parties
Obtaining standing to sue is not a major impediment in liti-
gation concerning presidential nominations. Where voting or mem-
,1 Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct.
1013 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Democratic Party v.
Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
41 See Brown, 469 F.2d at 570; Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. 1347; McMenamin v.
Philadelphia County Democratic Exec. Comm., 405 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
," See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1080-86; Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. at 361; Stuckey v.
Richardson, 372 S.E.2d 458, 460 (Ga. App. 1988).
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bership rights are concerned, plaintiffs, who have had their rights
denied or diminished, have standing." Where a candidate's rights
are at stake, the candidate may bring suit.4 5 In delegate challenges,
the competing slates of delegates may sue. 46 A political organization
that is not a party, but merely a faction or study group within it,
may lack standing, however, according to a majority of the judges
who addressed this issue in Ripon Society v. National Republican
Party.47 Obviously, such organizations could turn to their mem-
bership to find individual plaintiffs with standing.48
Identifying the proper defendant posed problems in the past.
As recently as 1971, the National Republican Party contended that
it could not be sued as an unincorporated association, arguing that
it was merely an aggregate of state parties acting in concert. 49 This
contention was rejected by the D.C. Circuit.5 0 The national parties
were later given statutory recognition in the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act. 5' The most recent Supreme Court decision on the subject
treated the "National Democratic Party of the U.S." as a legal
entity that was responsible for the national convention, its com-
mittees, and the party's various commissions.5 2 The political parties
See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51(1973) (plaintiff challenged statute barring
her from voting in primary); Gray, 372 U.S. at 375 (voter in primary challenged violation
of one person, one vote principle); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962); Erum v.
Cayetano, 881 F.2d 689, 691 (9th Cir. 1989); McLain v. Meier, 851 F.2d 1045, 1048 (8th
Cir, 1988); Bachur, 836 F.2d at 840; O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 688-90 (5th Cir. 1982).
But cf. Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1986), stay den. 479 U.S. 1301
(1985), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023 (1986) (mere dilution of vote may not be enough to
create standing).
41 Moore v, Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968);
Richard v. State of Louisiana, 544 So. 2d 1310 (La. App. 1989).
46 LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107.
, 525 F.2d 567, 573-74 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
41 Id. at 573.
41 See Georgia, 447 F.2d at 1273 n.2.
50 Id.
51 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 431-456, especially § 431(16) defining the term "political party,"
§ 431(14) defining "national committee," and § 437h(a) giving national committees standing
to sue.
52 LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107. Bachur v. Democratic National Party, 666 F. Supp. 763,
766 (D. Md. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987) found that "[t]he
Democratic National Party is a non-profit organization which, through the Democratic
National Committee, promulgated rules for the selection of delegates to the 1984 Democratic
National Convention." In Wymbs, the court found that:
Between quadrennial national conventions, the Republican National Commit-
tee is the embodiment and manager of the affairs of the Republican National
Party. During the Republican National Convention, the convention itself is
the Party. It conducts all of its own business, including the resolution of
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do not have standing, however, to independently enforce the Pres-
idential Election Campaign Fund Act.13
Finally, procedural fairness requires that a candidate whose
nomination is at issue be joiried as a necessary party, but candidates
who do not object to the practice at issue do not need to be
joined.5 4 National parties are necessary parties in local challenges
to the application of national party rules. 5
2. Timing
The biggest practical problem in using legal processes to influ-
ence the political process is that the courts move so slowly. A
controversy concerning the Illinois delegation to the 1972 Demo-
cratic convention was decided by the Supreme Court in 1975-and
this resolution overruled an injunction that was in effect at the
time of the convention.5 6 The litigants should have been thankful
that their case was decided more expeditiously than the legal battle
to outlaw the Texas "white only" Democratic primary, which
extended over two decades. 7 When the issue is a relatively abstract
institutional practice, such as malapportionment of delegates, the
litigants may be able to wait patiently for a ruling. But most
political lawsuits are intended to influence a particular election and
become moot if not decided quickly.
In the most sensitive cases, such as those involving delegate
challenges or ballot access, the courts have often had to act quickly.
In 1968, and again in 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on
presidential campaign litigation during the election year. The 1968
decision Williams v. Rhodes ordered the state of Ohio to include
George Wallace's American Independent Party on the ballot .5 The
credentials disputes, and sets the rules and platform upon which the Republican
National Committee will act until the next quadrennial convention.
Id. at 1074 n.7. As of 1989, the Republican National Committee is still an unincorporated
association. The Democratic National Committee has formed a corporation in the District
of Columbia under the name "DNC Services Corp." In addition, the Democratic Party
forms a special corporation to run its quadrennial conventions. In 1988, the corporation
was called the "1988 Democratic National Committee Convention Corp."
11 FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 484-90 (1985).
14 Farley v. Mahoney, 496 N.Y.S.2d 607, 611 (1985); Jordan v. Officer, 170 Ill. App.
3d 776, 525 N.E.2d 1067 (1988).
,1 See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1079-80; Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. at 1358 n.8.
56 Cousins, 419 U.S. 477.
17 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.
58 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See also Labor Farm Party v. Election Board, 117 Wis.2d 351,
344 N.W.2d 177 (1984) (Wisconsin Supreme Court decided case on merits prior to presi-
dential primary).
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Court refused to give similar relief to the Socialist Labor Party
because it had not acted as quickly to bring an appeal.59
The July 7, 1972, decision O'Brien v. Brown stayed federal
circuit court orders affecting the composition of the Illinois and
California delegations to the 1972 Democratic convention 0 There
were enough delegates at stake to change the outcome of the
convention. The Supreme Court's action left the ultimate decision
to the convention, 61 thereby insuring that Sen. McGovern would
receive the Democratic nomination. However, the Supreme Court
did not resolve all the issues; it did not rule on the merits and it
did not preclude further action by state courts.62 The legal brink-
manship involved in O'Brien and Williams is not feasible for most
litigation nor is it a desirable way to adjudicate important legal
issues. Since ordinary appellate review cannot be timely, writs and
stays are crucially important in campaign litigation. Plaintiffs are
at an inherent disadvantage because courts are reluctant to tamper
with the status quo if they are uncertain about the merits. Thus
far, the unfortunate situation where a preliminary ruling on a
critical nomination issue is reversed on the merits after the conven-
tion has been avoided. In 1980, it could have happened-an erro-
neous Wisconsin court order resulted in the seating of a delegation
chosen in violation of party rules-but the number of delegates
involved did not affect the outcome of the convention. 63
If appellate review is not complete prior to an election, the
case may be dismissed as moot.64 Federal courts ordinarily are
barred from deciding moot cases since they do not present a "case"
or "controversy" as required by article III, section 2 of the Con-
stitution. 65 If this policy was followed consistently, the opportunity
for the development of appellate precedents in the election law
field would be virtually eliminated. There is an exception to the
usual mootness rule, however, that has allowed appellate review of
statutes or party rules that are continuing in nature. The Supreme
11 Id. at 35.
409 U.S. 1 (1972).
6, Id. at 5.
62 See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 486.
63 Democratic Party v. ex rel. LaFollette, 287 N.W.2d 519 (1980), rev'd, 450 U.S.
107 (1981).
64 E.g., Keene v. Nat'l Democratic Party, 475 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding
the case moot in regard to seating of delegates, after being instructed by the Supreme Court,
409 U.S. 816 (1972), to determine the issue); Martin-Trigona v. Baxter, 345 N.W.2d 744,
745-46 (Iowa 1989).
' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964).
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Court explained this exception in Storer v. Brown, a 1974 decision
concerning access to the 1972 California ballot: 66
The 1972 election is long over, and no effective relief can be
provided to the candidates or voters, but this case is not moot,
since the issues properly presented, and their effects on independ-
ent candidacies will persist as the California statutes are applied
in future elections. This is, therefore, a case where the controversy
is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" doctrine, in the context of election
cases, is appropriate when there are "as applied" challenges as
well as in the most typical case involving only facial attacks. The
construction of the statute, an understanding of its operation,
and possible constitutional limits on its application, will have the
effect of simplifying future challenges, thus increasing the likeli-
hood that timely filed cases can be adjudicated before an election
is held.67
Federal courts have applied this doctrine in many election
cases. 68 In other cases, the procedural nature of the case preserves
the controversy after the election. For example, a lower court order
may have a continuing effect, 69 the party rule at stake may be
continuing,7 0 or contempt proceedings may follow a party's defi-
ance of a court order.7 1
3. Justiciability and the Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine poses a potentially important
bar to challenges arising from intra-party disputes. The political
question doctrine holds that certain types of legal challenges are
not justiciable, because, inter alia, the matter at hand is more
appropriately decided by another branch of government, there is
"a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it," or there is "the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion. "72
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
Id. at 737 n.8 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756
(1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972); Moore, 394 U.S. at 816 (1969);
Ferency v. Austin, 666 F.2d 1023, 1025 (6th Cir. 1981); Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 772-74.
69 See LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 115 n.13; Moore, 394 U.S. at 816.
70 Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1074-75 n.7; Bachur, 836 F.2d at 839 n.1; Ricard, 544 So.2d
1310.
' Cousins, 419 U.S. 477.
- Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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The Supreme Court has significantly limited the scope of the
political question doctrine, but lower courts continue to apply it
to presidential nomination litigation despite the lack of Supreme
Court precedent. As will be argued at greater length later,73 the
political question doctrine should not be applied to nomination
cases. Rather, the parties' associational rights provide a sounder
basis for a "hands-off policy" towards intra-party disputes.
The Supreme Court has severely limited the political question
doctrine in recent decades. Baker v. Carr4 and its progeny (the
one person, one vote cases 75) have established that the equal pro-
tection clause provides sufficiently definite standards to allow ju-
dicial review of districting for general and primary elections. Powell
v. McCormack held that the courts could review some decisions of
the House of Representatives concerning the fitness of its mem-
bers. 76 Powell suggests by analogy that the parties' resolution of
delegate challenges does not present a non-reviewable political ques-
tion. Even more recently, a majority of the Supreme Court held
that an equal protection challenge to the alleged gerrymandering
of the Indiana legislature was justiciable.7 7 No recent Supreme
Court decision has held an intra-party dispute to be a non-justici-
able political question. Nonetheless, the political question doctrine
remains an open issue in cases involving national political parties.
I Lower court decisions have found the political question doc-
trine applicable in presidential nomination cases. The Eighth Cir-
cuit invoked the political question doctrine in the 1968 case Irish
v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party.78 Plaintiffs attacked the Min-
nesota Democrats' use of unequally apportioned caucuses to select
delegates to the national convention. In a cryptic opinion, the court
concluded that there was "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" for reviewing the constitutionality of party
caucuses. Conversely, two subsequent D.C. Circuit cases held that
the legality of unequal apportionment of delegates among the states
was a justiciable issue. 79
1' See infra notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
74 369 U.S. 186.
71 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964);
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1962).
76 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
" Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986).
78 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
79 Bode, 452 F.2d at 1305; Georgia, 447 F.2d 1271.
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The Supreme Court revived the justiciability issue, perhaps
inadvertently, in O'Brien v. Brown,80 an opinion staying a D.C.
Circuit order that required the 1972 Democratic convention to seat
151 California delegates committed to Sen. George McGovern. The
Court also enjoined a slate of Illinois delegates under the control
of Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley from judicially challenging
their exclusion by the Convention's Credentials Committee.
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits, but the 5-4
per curiam ruling noted that
[h]ighly important questions are presented concerning justiciabil-
ity, whether the action of the Credentials Committee is state
action, and if so the reach of the Due Process Clause in this
unique context. Vital rights of assbciation guaranteed by the
Constitution are also involved. While the Court is unwilling to
undertake final resolution of the important constitutional ques-
tions presented without full briefing and argument and adequate
opportunity for deliberation, we entertain grave doubts as to the
action taken by the Court of Appeals."' (emphasis added)
Although this statement is hardly a clear holding on the justicia-
bility issue, the D.C. Circuit, apparently chastened by the Supreme
Court's opinion in O'Brien, decided to "pretermit" a decision on
the justiciability of a challenge to delegate apportionment in the
1975 Ripon Society decision. 2 Rather than decide if the case was
justiciable, the court found the case had no merit and hence there
was no need to decide if it was justiciable.83 The Fourth Circuit
followed the spirit of Ripon Society in Bachur v. Democratic
National Party, finding that the case was "not justiciable because
it [was] lacking in merit.' '84
In Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Committee, the Elev-
enth Circuit found that a challenge to the apportionment of dele-
gates within a state was non-justiciable1 5 The court based that
decision on three grounds: the national party was not made a party
to the litigation; the party's associational freedoms; and there was
a lack of proper standards to decide the case. 6 A 1988 federal
80 409 U.S. 1.
11 Id. at 4-5.
32 525 F.2d 567.
" Id. at 577-78.
836 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1987).
719 F.2d 1072, 1078-86 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
86 Id.
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district court case concerning delegate selection in Michigan came
to a similar conclusion, 87 as did a 1988 state court case involving
the selection of Republican delegates from Georgia. 88
Despite this smattering of precedent, most recent decisions have
resolved intra-party disputes on the merits with little or no discus-
sion of justiciability.89 The political question doctrine clearly re-
mains "in a state of some confusion." 90 This confusion is most
likely attributable to the perplexity created by the two purposes
served by the political question doctrine.
First, the political question doctrine serves as a surrogate for
the first amendment. Many cases invoking the political question
doctrine are based on the general principle that courts should not
intervene in party affairs. 91 This reluctance to intervene in party
affairs is commendable, but it properly arises from recognition of
the parties' first amendment associational rights, and not from an
ill-defined rule that some, but not all, cases involving intra-party
disputes are non-justiciable political questions. The courts should
not analogize intra-party disputes to political disputes in the other
Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. at 1360-61.
8 Stuckey v. Richardson, 372 S.E.2d 458 (1988).
" Eu, ... __U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1013 (1989) (challenge to statutes regulating com-
position of state party organizations); Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208 (challenge to statute requiring
closed primaries); LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (dispute over Wisconsin delegation to 1980
Democratic National Convention); Marchioro, 442 U.S. 191 (dispute over composition of
Washington State Democratic Party Committee); Cousins, 419 U.S. 477 (dispute over Illinois
delegation to 1972 Democratic National Convention); Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359 (7th
Cir. 1985) (dispute over alleged conspiracy to mislead voters in city primary election);
Hopfmann v. Connolly, 769 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1985) (dispute over rule limiting eligibility in
Democratic primary to candidates who received at least 15% of vote in party convention);
Ferency, 666 F.2d 1023 (dispute over selection of delegates to 1980 Democratic National
Convention); Montano, 575 F.2d 378 (2nd Cir. 1978) (challenge to New York procedures
for nominating candidates for special congressional election); Ammond v. McGahn, 532
F.2d 325 (3rd Cir. 1976) (dispute over state senator's exclusion from party caucus); Riddell
v. National Democratic Party, 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975) (dispute between rival factions
in state party over use of party name); Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973)
(dispute over selection of candidate by party committee); Jackson v. Michigan State Dem-
ocratic Party, 593 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (dispute over selection of Michigan
delegation to 1984 Democratic National Convention); Hunt v. Democratic Party of Okla-
homa, 439 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (challenge to composition of state party);
Martin-Trigona v. Dunn, 425 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (challenge to slate-making
activities of Democratic Party in Chicago mayoral election); Todd v. Oklahoma State
Democratic Central Committee, 361 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (challenge to com-
position of Democratic Party of Oklahoma).
91 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsnTUnONAL LAW 2d ed. §§ 3-13, at 96 (1988).
91 See, e.g., Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1082-83; Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 604 (Tamm, J.,
concurring); id. at 595 (Danaher, J., concurring); Irish, 399 F.2d 120; Heitmanis, 677 F.
Supp. at 1359.
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branches of government. Disputes between or within the non-
judicial branches of the federal government are non-justiciable
under separation-of-powers principles-principles that do not apply
to intra-party disputes. 92
A better analogy is to intramural conflicts within religious
organizations. These decisions are largely immune from legal at-
tack, not because the issues presented are non-justiciable-they are
immune because of first amendment concerns. 93 Interestingly, sev-
eral recent decisions holding intra-party disputes to be non-justi-
ciable make explicit reference to first amendment principles. 94 It is
intellectually sounder, however, for the courts to cease relying on
the political question doctrine and to base their analysis on pure
first amendment principles.
The political question doctrine has served a second, more de-
fensible, purpose. Many of the cases in which the doctrine has
been raised involve attempts to apply the one person, one vote
principle to delegate selection 95 or involve attacks on such practices
as the unit rule (which requires all delegates from a state or other
unit to vote for the same candidate), 96 gender quotas for delegates, 97
and the automatic granting of delegate status to party officials. 98
The difficulty in these cases is that, even if delegate selection is
state action, there are nonetheless no clear constitutional guidelines
on how delegates must be selected. In particular, the one person,
one vote principle is difficult to apply to national conventions since
they were never intended to be purely representative democratic
bodies. 99 There are, arguably, an infinite number of fair methods
by which a party may select a presidential nominee. It is not
surprising that some courts have recognized that legal challenges
to delegate selection formulas suffer from "lack of judicially dis-
See O'Brien, 409 U.S. at 11-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 Cf. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milovojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), reh.
den. 429 U.S. 873 (1976) (first amendment requires state court to defer to decisions of
church hierarchy); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
9, Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1086; Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. at 1361; Stuckey, 372 S.E.2d
at 460.
91 Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1086; Ripon Society, 525 F.2d at 567; Irish, 399 F.2d at 120.
O'Brien, 409 U.S. 1.
Bachur, 836 F.2d 837.
Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. 1347.
" See Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 611 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
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coverable and manageable standards" 100 or have recognized the
"impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. '" 101 Two of the criteria
for a political question are set forth in Baker.10
A fuller recognition of first amendment associational rights
would make this second purpose of the political question doctrine
largely obsolete as well. As argued more fully later,103 decisions
such as apportionment of delegates and delegate selection are pro-
tected by the first amendment and are not state action. These
activities have substantial immunity from statutory or constitu-
tional restraints. Thus, most challenges to these activities should
be rejected on first amendment grounds. In instances where state
action is present (i.e., primary elections), the political question
doctrine should not prevent the prohibition of practices that are
unconstitutional or are otherwise illegal, such as violations of the
Voting Rights Act. In short, if the parties' associational rights are
given the respect they deserve, the need to apply the political
question doctrine to cases arising from the presidential nomination
process would be eliminated. Continued reliance on this doctrine
in such cases is at odds with the tradition of judicial review that
began with Marbury v. Madison'04 and continued in Baker v.
Carr.10 5
III. STATE ACTION Vs. EXERCISE OF ASSOCIATION RIGHTS-WHAT
IS A NATIONAL CONVENTION?
A. Introduction
Thus far this Article has surveyed the substantive bases for
challenges to the presidential nomination process and discussed the
major procedural issues likely to arise in such challenges. We now
confront the more difficult question of the constitutional status of
the presidential nomination process. Legal challenges to the parties'
100 Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1085-86; Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 602-03 (Tamm, J., concur-
ring); id. at 614 (Wilkey, J., concurring); Irish, 399 F.2d at 121; Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp.
at 1359.
10, Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1082-84; Irish, 399 F.2d at 121; Heitmanis, 677 F. Supp. at
1359.
, 369 U.S. at 217.
101 See infra notes 106-45 and accompanying text.
104 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
101 369 U.S. at 217 n.50.
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actions involve two related constitutional issues. First, to what
extent are the parties' actions state action, thereby subjecting them
to constitutional attack? Second, to what extent are the actions an
exercise of the right of political association, thereby giving them a
measure of constitutional protection? The doctrines of state action
and associational freedom are potentially in conflict, but they may
also help to define one another.
B. Associational Rights
State and federal election laws regulate many aspects of party
affairs, such as voting qualifications, delegate selection procedures,
and campaign finance. Sometimes legislative action has been spon-
sored by the parties themselves (e.g., the white primary legislation
in southern states, applied only to Democratic primaries). °6 How-
ever, in other cases, such as the Progressive Era reforms, political
regulations were adopted in order to change the parties' traditional
way of doing business. 10 7 Only in the last few years has the Supreme
Court recognized constitutional limits on the extent to which gov-
ernment may regulate intra-party affairs. 08
As we shall see, the parties' conventions and delegate selection
methods are largely immune from state regulation because the
parties' associational rights outweigh the state's interest in regulat-
ing presidential nominations.'09 The case law also suggests that the
parties' associational rights will prevail over conflicting federal laws
except in the areas of campaign contributions and anti-discrimi-
nation legislation.110
1. Development of Associational Rights
The seninal cases of Cousins v. Wigoda1  and Democratic
Party v. Wisconsin ex. rel. LaFollette'1 2 developed from two related
sets of constitutional precedents. The first line of cases established
that private groups concerned with political affairs have a consti-
tutional right to be free of burdensome governmental regulations
'0 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
'07 CONGRESSIONAL QuARTERLY, supra note 1, at 379.
10, See infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
,"9 See infra notes 111-45 and accompanying text.
110 See infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
'" 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
-12 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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that are not justified by a compelling government interest.113 The
second line of cases established that voters have a constitutional
right to associate with the political party of their choice, which
can override state election laws, even if those laws are directed at
otherwise legitimate state concerns such as preserving the integrity
of primaries and the orderly regulation of access to the ballot." 4
The first line of cases developed from NAACP v. Alabama,
which struck down a state court order requiring the NAACP to
disclose its membership lists. 15 The Court found that the state
failed to show that disclosure had a substantial relationship to any
valid state interest, and therefore the NAACP's right to associate
could not be burdened.116 A crucial element in the opinion was the
Court's holding that the NAACP had the right to assert the con-
stitutional claims of its members." 7
The NAACP v. Alabama opinion pronounced that the consti-
tutional right of association was a "liberty" interest protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 8 Subsequent
cases emphasize a first amendment right to free association.Y"9
Despite this shift in textual authority, the central inquiry in chal-
lenging governmental burdens on private associations has remained
constant: whether the government has shown "compelling interests
that justify the imposition of its will."'' 20
The second line of cases arose from challenges to state election
laws. One leading case is Kusper v. Pontikes,12 1 which struck down
an Illinois law barring persons from voting in a party's primary if
they had voted in another party's primary during the preceding
twenty-three months. The Court found that the twenty-three month
rule "substantially restrict[ed] an Illinois voter's freedom to change
his political party affiliation" and that the state's legitimate interest
"' See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
"" See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
15 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
116 Id.
117 See id. at 458-60.
"I Id. at 460; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1960) (striking down
law that required public school teachers to declare all of their associational ties); Bates v.
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (voiding convictions for violating city ordinances that
required disclosure of the names of all members of organizations operating within the
municipalities).
"I See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
,20 Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981); Cousins
v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 24 (1968).
12, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
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in preventing "raiding" by crossover voters did not justify the
severe device used to prevent it.122 The earlier decision in Williams
v. Rhodes'23 invalidated Ohio laws that made it virtually impossible
for small or newly-formed parties to get on the ballot. These cases
are significant because, unlike NAACP v. Alabama and its prog-
eny, the state interests involved (preservation of the integrity of
primaries in Kusper and orderly regulation of ballot access in
Williams) were clearly legitimate state goals. These cases demon-
strated that associational rights take precedence over state election
laws absent a close link between the election law and the asserted
compelling state interests.
Cousins synthesized these two lines of cases, holding that state
election laws may not overrule a political party's decision on the
seating of delegates at its presidential nominating convention.' 24
The litigation arose when the Credentials Committee of the 1972
Democratic National Convention ruled that the fifty-nine person
delegation elected in a state-sponsored presidential primary to rep-
resent Chicago would not be seated because the local party organ-
ization (the famous Daley "machine") had violated several party
rules. The Convention's Credentials Committee replaced these del-
egates with an insurgent slate chosen in non-statutory party cau-
cuses. The elected slate obtained an injunction from an Illinois
court barring the insurgents from acting as delegates, but the full
Convention accepted the recommendation of the Credentials Com-
mittee and seated the insurgents. 2 5
The Illinois courts, subsequently held the insurgent slate in
contempt, finding that the state mandated primary election was
the exclusive legal means for choosing delegates.12 6 The U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the first amendment associa-
tional rights of the insurgent slate and the Democratic Party were
violated by the injunction. 2 7 The Court rejected the state's conten-
tion that it had a compelling interest in protecting the decision
made by its voters in the primary, reasoning that "It]he Convention
serves the pervasive national interest in the selection of candidates
'2 Id. at 57; compare Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (upholding a N.Y.
statute requiring primary voters to register as party adherents thirty days prior to the
previous general election).
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
,24 419 U.S. at 490.
,21 Id. at 478-81.
11 Id. at 481-83.
'7 Id. at 489.
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for national office, and this national interest is greater than any
interest of an individual state."' 28
The reasoning in Cousins leads to the conclusion that a state
only has very limited power to interfere with a national conven-
tion's decisions on delegate challenges, since it has no compelling
interest in the convention's national function. This conclusion was
reaffirmed in LaFollette.129 In LaFollette, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court ordered the National Democratic Party to seat a state dele-
gation that was legally bound to cast its votes in accordance with
the results in Wisconsin's "open" primary-an election in which
a voter could vote in any party's primary without pre-registration
or any public declaration of party affiliation. 130 Democratic party
rules required state parties to select delegates through procedures
restricted to "Democratic voters only who publicly declare their
party preference and have that preference publicly recorded.''3
The Supreme Court held that the party could enforce this rule by
refusing to seat the Wisconsin delegation. 3 2 The Court assumed
that Wisconsin could choose to hold an open primary, but it held
that Wisconsin could not compel the Democratic party to seat
delegates chosen in such an election.' 3
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have extended to local
parties the constitutional autonomy Cousins and LaFollette gave
to national parties. In Tashjian v. Republican Party,3 4 the Court
ruled that a Connecticut statute requiring parties to hold closed
primaries for state offices was unconstitutional as applied to the
Republican Party because that party had adopted a rule permitting
independent voters to vote in its primary. The Court employed a
balancing test and found that the purported state interests-reduc-
ing administrative costs, preventing "raiding" by non-members,
preventing voter confusion and protecting the two party system-
did not justify the statute's significant limitations on the party's
right to determine its own membership policies.1 35
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,
the Court held that California statutes barring political parties from
" Id. at 490.
129 450 U.S. 107.
110 Id. at 110-11.
"3 Rule 2A, Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Democratic National Convention.
M LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 121.
31 Id. at 126.
-- 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
"31 Id. at 217-25.
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endorsing candidates in party primaries and California statutes
specifying the composition of party committees were unenforcea-
ble. 136 The Court held that the statutes violated the parties' rights
of free speech and association.137
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused
to find in favor of private non-political organizations seeking to
use the doctrine of associational rights to evade statutes outlawing
discriminatory membership policies. In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, the Court held that the associational rights of the Jaycees
organization did not clothe it with immunity from a Minnesota
statute barring sex discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion.138
The Court came to a similar conclusion in Board of Directors
of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club.139 The Rotary organization revoked
the charter of a local affiliate because it admitted women, contrary
to the organization's rules. The local affiliate sued and obtained a
favorable judgment pursuant to California's Unruh (Civil Rights)
Act. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmedY °0 In considering the na-
tional organization's asserted right of expressive association, the
Court noted that, as a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take
positions on political or international issues.' 41 The Court followed
Roberts in holding that the state's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women outweighed the rights of the Rotary
members given the limited nature of the infringement. 42
Clearly, the Supreme Court has been far more protective of
the associational rights of political parties than those of other types
of organizations. 143 This is because the Court focuses on the con-
nection between the challenged legislation and the group's pur-
poses. Political parties benefit from the idea that "the membership
I- - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 1020 (1989). Cf. Geary v. Renne, 880 F.2d 1062
(1989) (upholding provisions of California law barring parties from endorsing candidates
for specified "nonpartisan" offices).
"I Id. at 1016.
138 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984).
139 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
lio Id.
141 Id. at 548.
142 Id. at 548-49; see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1 (1988) (rejecting a facial attack on a city anti-discrimination ordinance that applied to
certain private clubs).
141 Compare Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107; Cousins, 419 U.S. 477;
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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is the message." In Roberts and Rotary Club the Court found that
the avowed purposes of the Rotary Club, which were largely non-
political, were not likely to be affected by the compelled admission
of women. But in LaFollette, the Court held that, for political
parties, "the freedom to associate for the 'common advancement
of political beliefs,' . . . necessarily presupposes the freedom to
identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the
association to those people only."' 44 In Tashjian, the Court am-
plified this conclusion. It held that the Republican Party's attempt
to broaden its base by allowing freer participation in its primaries
was "conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of
association. As [the Court has previously] said, the freedom to
join together in furtherance of common political beliefs 'necessarily
presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the
association.' "'45
2. How Free Are the National Parties?
As a practical matter, the national parties will probably con-
tinue to allow state and federal statutes to govern delegate selection,
particularly in states with a long tradition of holding a presidential
primary. 146 Election laws are consistent, with the goals of party
leaders in most instances since party leaders are well-represented
in state legislatures and Congress. 147
1" LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 122 (quoting, in part, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, at
57 (1973)) (footnote omitted).
1' Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214 (quoting LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 127).
"4 Tum RuLEs OF THE RripumBcAN PARTY; Rule 32, adopted at the 1988 convention,
provides that delegates shall be selected in accordance with state law, except when state law
conflicts with specified national rules. A similar rule was in place prior to the 1988
convention. In addition, art. 2, § 2 of the current CHARaR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF
THE UNITED STATEs, provides that:
State Party rules or state laws relating to the election of delegates to the
National Convention shall be observed unless in conflict with this Charter and
other provisions adopted pursuant to authority of the Charter, including the
resolutions or other actions of the National Convention. In the event of such
conflict with state laws, state Parties shall be required to take provable positive
steps to bring such laws into conformity and to carry out such other measures
as may be required by the National Convention or the Democratic National
Committee.
" On the other hand, in Tashjian, the Second Circuit's opinion found that the state
Democratic Party deliberately tried to hurt the Republicans by requiring them to use a
closed primary. Republican Party of State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 270,
281-83 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 208 (1986). The author suspects this type of games-
manship to be the exception, not the rule, at least in presidential politics. See, e.g., Ricard,
544 So. 2d 1310 (statute incorporated party rule).
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Despite these practical realities, it would be useful if party
leaders, candidates, and lawmakers could predict whether a given
statute can be constitutionally applied to an unwilling party. Be-
cause the established constitutional test involves case-by-case bal-
ancing and because some Supreme Court decisions have been closely
split, perfect predictability is out of reach. But some generalizations
are possible.
a. National Parties vs. State Laws
The national parties are in a very strong position to defy state
laws governing delegate selection because the Supreme Court has
held that the states do not have a compelling interest in regulating
the choice of presidential nominees. In Cousins, the majority flatly
stated that:
The States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in
the great task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates ... The Convention serves the pervasive national
interest in the selection of candidates for national office, and this
national interest is greater than any interest of an individual State
... Thus Illinois' interest in protecting the integrity of its elec-
toral process cannot be deemed compelling in the context of the
selection of delegates to the National Party Convention. 48
This blanket statement was not repeated in LaFollette, but the
LaFollette Court gave even less weight to the claimed state interest
in delegate selection. The Court held that states have an interest
in regulating presidential primary elections, but do not have a
compelling interest in "the imposition of voting requirements upon
those who, in a separate process, are eventually selected as dele-
gates." 149
As discussed above, there is a strong connection between the
internal rules of national parties and their constitutionally protected
purposes. 150 Given the weak interest that states have in the selection
of presidential nominees, the national parties are in a strong legal
position when they defy state laws. This is reflected in several
circuit court decisions that have held that the national parties are
,41 419 U.S. at 489-91.
"4 450 U.S. at 125.
I" See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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not bound by state laws purporting to regulate presidential nomi-
nations. 5'
b. Federal Authority vs. Party Rules
The Supreme Court has been more willing to uphold federal
legislation that conflicts with party autonomy. 52 Interestingly, this
tendency is not based on anything in the text of the Constitution,
but rather on the Court's assumption that the federal government
should have a major role in regulating elections to federal offices.'5 3
In practice, the federal government is directly involved in nom-
ination campaigns, national conventions, and the general election
campaigns of party nominees. It subsidizes both primary campaigns
and party conventions under the Federal Election Campaign Act. ,54
But the federal government has not tried to tell the parties who
they must seat as delegates as Illinois did in Cousins'55 and Wis-
consin did in LaFollette.'5 6 As a result, there is less certainty as to
the federal government's power to intervene in party affairs.
One cannot assume that the federal government is subject to
the same restraints as the states. Justice Brennan's statement in
Cousins that "[t]he Convention serves the pervasive national inter-
est in the selection of candidates for national office and this
national interest is greater than any interest of an individual state' ' 57
can certainly be read to imply that national goals embodied in
federal legislation will weigh more heavily in the constitutional
balance.
(i) Constitutional Sources of Federal Authority Over Presidential
Elections
An unschooled reader of the Constitution could be forgiven
for thinking that the federal government has less authority over
presidential nominations than state governments. Article II, section
"I See Ferency v. Austin, 666 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1981) (Michigan statute requiring
open presidential primary could not be enforced against National Democratic Party); Riddell
v. Nat'l Democratic Party, 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975) (invalidating Mississippi statute
governing use of the term Democratic Party in the context of dispute concerning seating at
national convention).
,12 See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
' 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456.
'" See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
"I See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 490.
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1 of the U.S. Constitution, which specifies the process for selection
of the president, states that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Elec-
tors."' 58 The states' electors meet in their respective states and vote
for the candidates for president and vice-president. 59 If one set of
candidates for the two offices receives a majority of the electoral
vote, as they have in every election since 1876, those candidates
become president and vice-president. If there is no majority in the
electoral vote, as in 1876, and as nearly happened in 1968, the
House of Representatives selects the president but each state con-
gressional delegation votes as a unit. 6°
This system clearly assumes that each state is to choose its
preference for national office-each state votes separately. The
textual basis for federal power over presidential elections is rela-
tively slight: article II, section 1, clause 2 authorizes Congress to
"determine the Time of choosing the Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their Votes."' 6' This contrasts with article I,
section 4, clause 1, which authorizes Congress to make or alter
regulations over the time, place, and manner of holding Congres-
sional elections.162
Despite the contrast in Constitutional language, the Supreme
Court has not limited federal power over presidential elections to
merely regulating their timing. In Burroughs v. United States,'63
the Court found that federal power over presidential elections is
extensive. The issue was whether the provisions of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act requiring disclosure of financial contribu-
tions to presidential campaigns were constitutional. The Court held
that:
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation.
The importance of his election and the vital character of its
relationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the
whole people cannot be too strongly stated. To say that Congress
is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such
an election from the improper use of money to influence the
result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of
,' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
119 Id. at cl. 3, amend. XII.
1o Id.
161 Id. at art. II, § 1, ci. 2.
162 Id. at art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
1"3 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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self-protection. Congress undoubtedly possesses that power, as it
possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments
and institutions of the general government from impairment or
destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption.'6
The Court quoted extensively from its earlier decision in Ex
Parte Yarbrough, a decision upholding Congress' power to protect
the right to vote in Congressional elections. The Burroughs Court
thereby implied that Congressional power to regulate presidential
elections was equal to its power over Congressional elections. 16
The source of this power seemingly derives from necessity rather
than any particular clause in the Constitution.
In Oregon v. Mitchell,166 in ruling on the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act, a majority of the Court seemingly assumed
that Congressional power over presidential elections was congruent
with Congressional power over Congressional elections. Justice
Black was the swing vote in a divided Court. In a footnote, he
adopted the theory of Burroughs that Congress has plenary power
over presidential elections.
[T]his Court in Burroughs v. United States... upheld the power
of Congress to regulate certain aspects of elections for presidential
and vice-presidential electors, specifically rejecting a construction
of Art. II, Sec. I, that would have curtailed the power of Congress
to regulate such elections. Finally, and most important, inherent
in the very concept of a supreme national government with na-
tional officers is a residual power in Congress to insure that those
officers represent their national constituency as responsively as
possible. This power arises from the nature of our constitutional
system of government and from the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 167
In United States v. Classic, the Court had construed the article I,
section 4 grant of Congressional power over Congressional elections
as extending to Congressional primaries as well. 6 8 Finally, in Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 6 9 which upheld public financing of presidential cam-
paigns, a majority of the Justices subscribed to part III of the
Court's opinion, which stated flatly that "Congress has the power
64 Id. at 545.
-- 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
1- 400 U.S. 112 (1979).
367 Id. at 124 n.7.
366 313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941).
369 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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to regulate Presidential elections and primaries," citing Classic and
Burroughs.70
(ii) Federal Authority Over Campaign Finance
First amendment rights have been tested against federal power
in the area of campaign finance. These cases, however, offer only
limited insight into how the Supreme Court would react to other
types of federal restrictions on political parties.
Buckley is the seminal case concerning federal power to regulate
presidential campaign finance. Initially, the Court held that Con-
gress has plenary power to regulate presidential elections, as dis-
cussed above.' 71 Next, the Court acknowledged that the
constitutional guarantee of free association for the advancement
of political beliefs encompasses the right to associate with a polit-
ical party.172 The Court upheld limits on financial contributions to
political parties and candidates based on the governmental interest
in deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption. 173 The
Court also held, however, that limits on expenditures for political
speech, which are independent from a candidate's campaign, were
unconstitutional. 174
More significant for our purposes, the Court held that public
financing of presidential nomination campaigns and national con-
ventions was constitutional. 75 The Court rejected an analogy to
the proscribed public financing of religion, holding that public
financing of conventions and election campaigns facilitates rather
than abridges first amendment rights. 176 The Court also dismissed
as purely speculative the concern that federal financing would lead
to federal control of parties' internal affairs. 77
Justice Burger's dissent made some interesting points. It con-
cluded that public financing of partisan campaigns was not a
legitimate expenditure of public funds, finding the analogy to
separation of church and state to be persuasive. 178 Justice Burger
110 Id. at 90. For a discussion of Burroughs, see supra notes 163-64 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Classic, see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
M' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 n.16 (1976).
172 Id. at 15.
" Id. at 12-60.
174 Id. at 85-108.
"I Id. at 92-93.
176 Id. at 93.
17 Id. at 93 n.126.
"7I Id. at 248 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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noted that delegate selection has always been private and speculated
that the decision in Buckley might lead to judicial monitoring of
delegate selection. 179
A 1985 decision, Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Commission, strengthened the first
amendment rights of political organizations. The Court held that
a statute making it illegal for a political action committee to spend
over $1,000 on the campaign of a presidential candidate who had
accepted public financing was unconstitutional. 180 The Court found
that such expenditures "produce speech at the core of the First
Amendment."'' The Court also held that there was a distinction,
for constitutional purposes, between purely political organizations
and corporations or labor organizations; limitations on political
expenditures of such non-political groups had been deemed consti-
tutional in earlier decisions. 82 This opinion suggests once again
that political associations have a greater associational autonomy
than economic associations.
Finally, there is one potentially significant circuit court decision
in the area of public financing. In re Carter/Mondale Reelection
Committee held that it would violate the first amendment rights
of the Carter campaign to deny federal funding pending an inves-
tigation of potential violations of campaign laws by the Federal
Election Commission (FEC). 183 This decision suggests that, after
the national convention, a legal challenger may have a difficult
burden to overcome in denying the nominee his or her federal
funding.
(iii) Analogy to State Regulation of State Parties
A more fruitful method for predicting how the courts will
resolve conflicts between federal law and party associational free-
doms is to examine Supreme Court precedents concerning state
regulation of state conventions and party committees. As recently
as 1979, four years after Cousins, the Supreme Court held that a
state party organization was not constitutionally immune from state
election laws regulating the membership of the party's state com-
Id. at 250 (Burger, J., dissenting).
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
,' Id. at 493.
2 Id. at 495-96, 500-01. Cf. FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982)
(limiting political fund-raising by corporations).
,-1 642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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mittee. In Marchioro v. Chaney, the Court considered a challenge
to a Washington statute providing that each party's state committee
must consist of two persons from each county in the state. 84 The
state Democratic Party adopted procedures for selecting additional
delegates,' one from each legislative district. The state committee
refused to seat the additional delegates based on the statute. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Washington Supreme
Court, which held that the statute did not infringe on the first
amendment associational rights of the party. 185
However, Marchioro was only a temporary setback in the
progress of the associational rights of political parties. The Su-
preme Court relied on some unusual factual circumstances to avoid
deciding the core first amendment issue. The Court found that an
unregulated body, the state party convention, had actual control
over state party activities. 8 6 The statutorily mandated state party
committee only had two functions: filling vacancies in the national
convention delegation, which was not at issue, and certain powers
over internal party affairs. Because these powers over internal party
affairs were granted to the statutory state committee by the party's
unregulated state convention, the Supreme Court held that there
was no first amendment violation.'1 The Court stated that
all of the "internal party decisions" which appellants claim should
not be made by a statutorily composed Committee are made not
because of anything in the statute, but because of delegations of
authority from the Convention itself.... There can be no com-
plaint that the party's right to govern itself has been substantially
burdened by statute when the source of the complaint is the
party's own decision to confer critical authority on the State
Committee.'88
The Supreme Court subsequently held that state parties had
protection from a state statute in Tashjian.18 9 The Court held that
the Republican Party could ignore a Connecticut statute requiring
the party to hold a closed primary because the statute contravened
party rules that permitted unaffiliated voters to participate. 19 This
,,' 442 U.S. 191 (1979).
", Marchioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 47 (Wash. 1978), aff'd, 442 U.S. 191 (1979).
11 442 U.S. at 198-99.
17 Id.
I" Id.
"9 479 U.S. 208.
190 Id. at 224-25.
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decision firmly established that the type of autonomy granted the
national parties in Cousins 91 and LaFollette92 also applies to state
party organizations. Presumably, the state's interests weigh more
heavily on a balancing test when they are applied to the conduct
of state elections but, nonetheless, the Tashjian Court found that
the party's associational right to define participation in its primary
outweighed the state's interests, even as to elections for state of-
fices.193
The Supreme Court went even farther in recognizing state party
autonomy in the recent unanimous decision in Eu. 194 The Eu Court
struck down California statutes that dictated the structure of party
organizations at the county and state levels. 195 The statutes also
established the maximum term for the chair of a state party central
committee, required that the chair rotate between residents of the
northern and southern parts of the state, and imposed other re-
strictions on party affairs. 96 The Court found that all of these
requirements were unconstitutional. 97
The Court gave short shrift to the state's arguments that these
statutes served a compelling interest, holding that
[the state] contends that the challenged laws serve a compelling
"interest in the 'democratic management of the political party's
internal affairs' ".... This, however, is not a case where inter-
vention is necessary to prevent the derogation of civil rights of
party adherents .... Moreover, as we have observed the State
has no interest in "protect[ing] the integrity of the Party against
the Party itself" . . . a state cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the party as to the desirability of a particular internal
party structure, any more than it can tell a party that its proposed
communication to party members is unwise. 9 s
Cases at the federal circuit level have also recognized that state
statutes are vulnerable if they infringe upon state parties' associa-
tion rights. An interesting older case is Riddell v. National Dem-
'91 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
193 479 U.S. at 217-25.
,14 Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct.
1013 (1989).
"9' Id. at 1016.
196 Id.
10 Id. at 1025.
"9 Id.
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ocratic Party.'99 The case arose from a split in the Mississippi
Democratic Party between the "Regular Faction," representing the
established state party, and the "Loyalist Faction." The loyalist
faction had been recognized as the official Democratic Party of
Mississippi for purposes of the Democratic National Convention
since 1958. The Loyalists favored integration and favored civil
rights legislation which the Regular Faction opposed. The Regular
Faction sought an injunction requiring the national Democratic
Party to seat their delegation at the 1972 convention. The trial
court agreed that the Regular Faction should be seated at the
convention, but refused to issue an injunction against the national
Democratic Party. 200
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Mississippi's party reg-
istration statute, which prohibited the Loyalists from referring to
themselves as the Democratic Party, violated the right of free
association. 20 1 It opined that a split in the state Democratic Party
could not be papered over by statute, but rather was properly
resolved through the political process. 2°2 This case suggests that if
a national political convention were to split, the F.E.C. and state
election officials might have to recognize both factions.
In Hopfmann v. Connolly, the First Circuit upheld a rule of
the Massachusetts Democratic Party limiting access to the ballot
in the state primary to candidates who received fifteen percent or
more of the votes at a party convention. 20 3 The court found that
the first amendment associational rights of supporters of a candi-
date excluded from the ballot were not violated by the party and
the state's enforcement of the fifteen percent rule. The court relied
almost exclusively on decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court in Langone v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,2°4
which decided the same question. The state court followed La-
Follette2°5 in holding that it could not construe state election laws
to nullify the Democratic Party's rules on ballot access because
"[w]e view this as a substantial interference with the fundamental
1- 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 773-74.
2' Id. at 779.
Id. at 778.
201 769 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1023 (1987).
1' 446 N.E.2d 43 (Mass.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1087 (1983). N.E.2d 43 (Mass.), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1087 (1983).
20 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
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rights of association guaranteed to the party and its members by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ' 2206
Curry v. Baker is another federal circuit court opinion uphold-
ing state party autonomy.2 7 Pursuant to state statutory authority, 20 8
the Alabama Democratic Party adopted a rule prohibiting voters
who had participated in other parties' nomination procedures from
voting in its primaries or its run-off primaries. One of the two
contenders in the Democratic run-off primary for governor urged
voters who earlier had voted in the Republican primary to crossover
and vote for him. A state party committee found that there were
enough crossover voters to have swung the election and gave the
nomination to the candidate who received a minority of the votes,
but presumably a majority of the valid, non-crossover votes.
The 11th Circuit upheld the validity of the state party rule
against crossovers. 209 It also upheld the state party committee's
decision to give the second place finisher the nomination. 210 The
party's decision was based on the findings of voter surveys, which
showed that crossover voting changed the result. The case has
interesting implications, assuming it would be followed by a federal
court reviewing a national convention's actions. The role of the
state party in overturning the results of the primary is very similar
to what the credentials committee and full party conventions do in
reviewing the results of individual state contests for delegates. The
Curry decision anticipated Tashjian and Eu in granting substantial
deference to the decision of official state party committees.
(iv) Summary
To summarize, Supreme Court and circuit court decisions,
apart from the unusual case of Marchioro,211 have consistently
upheld the freedom of state party conventions and committees to
organize themselves and their nomination processes for state-wide
offices as they deem appropriate. 212 The courts have refused to
apply state statutes in a manner that conflicts with party rules.
Langone v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 446 N.E.2d 43, 47-48 (Mass.), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1087 (1983).
- 802 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1986).
ALA. CODE §§ 17-16-14 (1975).
21 Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 1986).
210 Id. at 1312.
211 See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
212 But cf. Farley v. Mohoney, 496 N.Y.S.2d 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), aff'd, 496
N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (state party required to meet filing deadlines).
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Assuming this is the best possible analogy for future conflicts
between federal legislation and national party rules, it seems likely
that party rules would also prevail over conflicting federal statutes,
as least insofar as those statutes impose a burden on associational
freedom. The cases involving campaign finance laws certainly con-
firm the familiar principle that associational rights must give way
to compelling state interests where the statute is narrowly drawn
so as to minimize intrusion on party rights. But, outside of the
limited context of campaign finance laws, federal legislation as well
as state legislation must give way to party associational freedoms.
c. Invidious Discrimination is Not Protected
The parties' associational freedom has a potentially important
exception. The Supreme Court has been understandably reluctant
to enforce private associational rights when they conflict with
constitutional or statutory restrictions on racial or sexual discrim-
ination. This reluctance first surfaced in state action cases such as
Terry v. Adams, 2 1 and Shelley v. Kraemer,21 4 and was reaffirmed
in cases involving civil rights laws such as Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States.215 In Hishon v. King & Spalding,2 6 a law
partnership argued that it had a constitutional right to discriminate
against women. The Court held that
"[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a
form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative consti-
tutional protections. . . ." There is no constitutional right, for
example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a
private school or join a labor union.21 7
In balancing the expressive rights of political parties against
the rights of those excluded on racial, religious, sexual, or other
prohibited grounds, the courts will probably continue to be reluc-
tant to condone "invidious discrimination," at least when it in-
213 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See infra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
214 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (restrictive covenants based on race are judicially unenforceable).
215 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Congress may employ its interstate commerce power to regulate
discrimination in public accommodations that affect interstate commerce).
216 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
217 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)).
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volves the major parties. 218 Such discriminatory rules should have
less constitutional protection than other types of rules. On the
other hand, the close connection between the parties' rules and
their expressive purposes and associational reason for being may
provide them greater protection than other types of organizations.
Whatever the result, it is reasonably clear that racially and sexually
exclusionary party rules face a higher burden. This is reasonable
given the strong constitutional policy against discrimination.
C. State Action
1. The Importance of State Action
The question of whether a particular party activity amounts to
state action is crucial in any challenge based on federal constitu-
tional grounds. Since the Civil Rights Cases219 were decided in
1883, a finding of state action has been a prerequisite to applying
the equal protection and due process guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment. The state action requirement also applies to other
potential constitutional challenges to the presidential nomination
process .220
Several important state action decisions directly address the
status of the political nomination process at the state level. The
Texas White Primary Cases dealt with blatant racial exclusion by
a state party that had an effective monopoly on political power in
the state.22' The context of contemporary national political conven-
tions is quite different: they are national in scope, they exercise
only duopoly power over the presidency, and overt racial exclusion
seems to be a thing of the past. Nonetheless, the reach of the state
action concept is likely to remain an important issue in litigation
concerning presidential nominations.
State action is important because the procedures by which
delegates are selected are potentially vulnerable to a variety of
28 A minor party could argue that it is organized on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds
(e.g., Black Panthers, Ku Klux Klan, or fundamentalist Christian groups). The major parties
are in no position to so argue. See PREAMLE TO THE RULEs OF Tm REPUBLICAN PARTY and
CHARTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF Tm UNITED STATES, Preamble and Art. I, § 4,
stating the major parties' philosophy of being open to all.
219 109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883).
21 A finding of state action is a prerequisite to relief in cases asserting first amendment
speech rights. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
221 See infra notes 228-49 and accompanying text.
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equal protection challenges, even absent blatant racial discrimina-
tion. For example, both major parties have undertaken affirmative
action effortsm that may be subject to attack as reverse discrimi-
nation, as in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke22
and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.224
State action is also relevant to delegate apportionment. Delegate
apportionment is governed by intricate formulas, generally arrived
at after a struggle between party factions. Whatever the formula,
delegates are never allocated to the states on a precise one person,
one vote or a one party member, one vote basis. A challenge could
be based on the equal protection rights of under-represented party
members if the apportionment scheme is considered state action.
Finally, state action is crucial because state action must comply
with due process requirements. The effect of the imposition of
court-mandated due process safeguards on the party's procedures
for selecting delegates and nominating their national ticket could
be profound. The presence or absence of state action in the pres-
idential nomination process has been discussed frequently in both
legal treatises and articles. 225
2. Potential Grounds For Finding State Action
Given that the Supreme Court has held that the selection and
seating of delegates at a party's national convention is an exercise
of associational rights, it might seem obvious that such activities
are not state action. Nonetheless, there is legal precedent to the
contrary. Challengers can assert plausible grounds for finding state
action even at the national convention itself. These grounds will
be discussed individually along with a critical evaluation of each.
The author concludes that in light of the parties' associational
rights, the national conventions and the means of selecting dele-
gates are, for the most part, not state action.
" See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
-3 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
- U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
See, e.g., Chambers & Rotunda, Reform of Presidential Nominating Conventions,
56 VA. L. REv. 179, 194-96 (1979); Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on
Political Parties in the Wake of Cousins v. Wigoda, 53 TEx. L. REv. 935, 951-60 (1975);
Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Pro-
tections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 213, 214-54 (1984); Note,
Freedom of Association and State Regulation of Delegate Selection, 36 VAND. L. REv. 105,
134-36 (1983); Comment, Cousins and LaFollette: An Anomaly Created By a Choice
Between Freedom of Association and the Right to Vote, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 666, 677-81.
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a. Public Function
One of the more familiar principles in the law of state action
is that if a private party performs a public function, it becomes
subject to the restraints the constitution places on the state. Per-
forming a public function is treated as state action.2 2 6
A series of legal challenges to the Texas Democratic Party's
policy of excluding blacks from its nomination process first gave
rise to the public function doctrine. 227 Despite this history, however,
it is becoming increasingly obvious that the public function theory
is not properly applicable to parties' actions in choosing candidates
as long as the government is not otherwise involved in the parties'
actions.
As noted, the public function theory of state action developed
out of a particular historical struggle-the effort to end the post-
Reconstruction Texas Democratic Party's policy of barring blacks
from participating in its primary elections. The first of the Texas
White Primary Cases, Nixon v. Herndon,22 held that a statute
enforcing racial restrictions in the state-run Democratic primary
was unconstitutional. The Court rejected Texas' argument29 that
the statute dealt solely with the affairs of a private group.
The Texas Democrats responded by passing a statute that gave
the executive committee of a political party "the power to prescribe
the qualifications of its own members." The Supreme Court held,
in Nixon v. Condon, that this statute made the executive commit-
tees' acts state action. The executive committees would not have
possessed the power to make membership rules excluding blacks in
the absence of the statute because general authority over party
affairs was ordinarily held by the state party convention.2 10 The
Court held that, because it received its power from the state, the
Democratic Party's executive committee was acting as an "organ
of the state" and, therefore, was subject to the fourteenth amend-
ment's prohibition of racial discrimination. 231 The Court left open
the question of the party's authority to determine its own mem-
bership in the absence of a statute.
22 See infra notes 227-364 and accompanying text.
"2 See infra notes 228-49 and accompanying text.
- 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
See id. at 538.
-0 286 U.S. 73, 85 (1932).
21 Id. at 88.
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The Texas Democrats won a temporary victory by adopting a
resolution at their state convention barring blacks from voting in
Democratic primaries. In Grovey v. Townsend, the Supreme Court
found that this policy was not state action and that the party was
merely exercising its inherent power to define its membership.
2 32
The New Deal court that came into being after 1935 adopted
a more expansive approach to state action. In Classic,2 3 a case
concerning the applicability of federal election fraud laws to state
primary elections, the Court reversed an earlier holding2 4 that
primary elections were not elections for constitutional purposes.
235
The Court opined that if "state law has made the primary an
integral part of the procedure of choice, or [if] in fact the primary
effectively controls the choice" then a constitutional right exists to
participate in the primary and federal laws may protect that right.
236
Classic was not a state action case, but the Court's ruling that
primary elections were part of the electoral scheme had an impor-
tant impact on state action theory. In Smith v. Allwright, another
Texas case, the Court relied on Classic to overrule Grovey.2 7 The
Court stated that "the recognition of the place of the primary in
the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party
of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is dele-
gation of a state function that may make the party's action the
action of the State." 23 This statement marked the birth of the rule
that some activities are inherently state (or public) functions and
hence are state action regardless of who performs them.
The public function theory was restated by the Fourth Circuit
in 1947 in Rice v. Elmore, a class action suit challenging racial
restrictions on participation in the South Carolina Democratic pri-
mary.239 The legislature had repealed its laws regulating primary
elections in the wake of Allwright, putting this function under the
complete control of the party. The court found that "[tihe party
may, indeed, have been a mere private aggregation of individuals
in the early days of the Republic, but with the passage of the
-2 295 U.S. 45, 53 (1935).
23 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921).
- Classic, 313 U.S. at 317-18.
11 313 U.S. at 318.
-7 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
218 Id. at 660.
-9 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
14 Id. at 388.
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years, political paries have become in effect state institutions,
governmental agencies through which sovereign power is exercised
by the people."' 1 The court held that the actions of party officials
were subject to constitutional review because "[h]aving undertaken
to perform an important function relating to the exercise of sov-
ereignty by the people, they may not violate the fundamental
principles laid down by the Constitution for its exercise." 242
The Fourth Circuit adhered to this view in Baskin v. Brown ,2 3
a 1949 case challenging racial restrictions on participation in the
South Carolina Democratic primary. The court held that:
The argument is made that a political party does not exercise
state power but is a mere voluntary organization of citizens to
which the constitutional limitations upon the powers of the state
have no application. This may be true of a political party which
does not undertake the performance of state functions, but not
of one which is allowed by the state to take over and operate a
vital part of its electoral machinery. 2"
Rice and Baskin were cited with approval in Terry, the last of
the Supreme Court's Texas White Primary Cases. 245 The issue in
Terry was whether the Jaybird Democratic Association, an all-
white Democratic organization in Fort Bend County, Texas, could
exclude blacks from primary elections that it held prior to the
official Democratic primary. Eight Justices, in four separate opin-
ions, held that the Jaybird's primary was state action. Significantly,
however, none of the opinions held that party nominations were
necessarily a state or public function. Instead, the Justices focused
on the special facts of the case: the Jaybirds admitted intent to
evade constitution restrictions; 2A6 their success in staging the only
local election that mattered;2 7 the fact that county officials voted
in the Jaybird primary; 24 and the connections between the statutory
official party and the Jaybird Association. 249 In short, Terry is a
241 Id. at 389.
242 Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
z, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).
Id. at 394.
241 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 465-66 (1953).
24 Id. at 463-64, 469-70 (Black, J., opinion); id. at 474-77 (Frankfurter, J., opinion);
id. at 480, 483-84 (Clark, J., concurring).
247 Id. at 463, 469 (Black, J., opinion); id. at 472, 474, 477 (Frankfurter, J., opinion);
id. at 480, 483-84 (Clark, J., concurring).
2,, Id. at 473-77 (Frankfurter, J., opinion).
241 Id. at 482-84 (Clark, J., concurring).
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case where a court might have found that party nominations are a
public function, but did not. If it is a public function case, it is
so only by implication.
Subsequent lower court decisions went further. A 1971 D.C.
Circuit decision held that the process of nominating a candidate
for president was state action. In Georgia v. National Democratic
Party, the court read the. Texas White Primary Cases as holding
that nominating is a public function.20 The court was reviewing a
constitutional challenge to the delegate apportionment formulas
proposed by the two major parties for their 1972 national conven-
tions. The court found that the parties' rules were state action,
stating that
[t]he Supreme Court has consistently found state action in the
activities of state political parties insofar as those activities touch
upon the machinery whereby candidates are nominated by the
parties to seek election to local or national office. This is the
clear force of the Texas White Primary Cases; and, as those cases
and others demonstrate, it makes no difference for purposes of
finding state action that the state party acts through a statewide
party primary, a state party convention, or a state party com-
mittee.25'
Several other cases decided prior to the 1972 party conventions
also held that national party rules or decisions were state action,
although these decisions were not necessarily based on the principle
that nomination is a public function. 22
Georgia v. National Democratic Party, and other decisions with
similar holdings, have been subject to criticism.213 In this writer's
opinion, these decisions are no longer good law to the extent they
hold that nominating a candidate for national office is itself a
public function. This conclusion is based on two contentions. First,
the Supreme Court has curtailed the scope of the public function
- 447 F.2d 1271, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 1275.
Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 816
(1972); Bode v. Nat'l Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972); Doty v. Montana State Democratic Cent. Comm., 333 F.
Supp. 49, 51 (D. Mont. 1971); Maxey v. Wash. State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp.
673, 678 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
211 See Ripon Soc'y v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 574-75 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
id. at 596-602 (Tamm, J., concurring); id. at 605-09 (Wilkey, J., concurring);" Weisburd,
supra note 225, at 221-51.
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theory.25 4 Second, subsequent Supreme Court cases recognizing
party associational rights imply that nominating a candidate is, or
can be, a constitutionally protected private function. 255
The scope of the public function concept was contracted after
an expansive period during which the Supreme Court found that
owning a company town,256 operating a park,25 7 and even operating
a shopping center258 were public functions. The contraction began
with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,259 in which the Court reversed itself
and held that a large private shopping center could not be sued
for interfering with first amendment rights. 260
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Court held that a
heavily regulated private utility that cut off service to a customer
pursuant to state-approved tariff rules was not performing a public
function.2 61 The Court imposed an important limitation on the
public function theory when it held that the public function theory
was limited to "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State. ' ' 262 According to the Court, the public function at issue in
the White Primary Cases was holding an "election. ' 26 Thus, the
Court in Metropolitan Edison did not read the earlier cases as
holding that nominating a candidate was a public function.
Finally, the Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority, though not a state action case, strongly
criticizes the central premise of the public function theory, viz.,
that certain activities are "traditional governmental functions. '"264
The second trend affecting state action questions is the Court's
increasing recognition of first amendment associational rights. If
national conventions are private associations exercising first amend-
ment rights, it seems inconsistent to hold that they are simultane-
__ See infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
255 See infra notes 265-88 and accompanying text.
' Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
' Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
2S Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
-1 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
2w Id. at 570.
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Id. at 352.
' Id.
469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985). The Court overruled National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which held that Congress could not constitutionally apply the
Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees engaged in areas of traditional governmental
functions. The Garcia Court concluded that attempts to define such functions were un-
workable. Id. at 538-47.
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ously carrying out a public function. The Supreme Court has
mandated that a party's "freedom to associate for the 'common
advancement of political beliefs ... necessarily presupposes the
freedom to identify the people who constitute the association' "
and that "[a]ny interference with the freedom of a party is simul-
taneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents. ' 265
These holdings strongly imply that party actions are constitutionally
protected from constitutional scrutiny.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not yet held that the state
action holdings in the White Primary Cases are limited by the
associational rights recognized in Cousins and LaFollette. The
Cousins opinion emphasized that it did not address the questions
of "whether the decisions of a national political party in the area
of delegate selection constitute state or governmental action ...
[and] ... whether national political parties are subject to the
principles of the reapportionment decisions, or other constitutional
restraints in their methods of delegate selection and allocation.' '266
The subsequent decision in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks did
elucidate the courts position concerning the status of nominations
as a public function. 267 The Court, in dicta, opined that
[w]hile the Constitution protects private rights of association and
advocacy with regard to the election of public officials, our cases
make it clear that the conduct of elections themselves is an
exclusively public function ... The doctrine does not reach to
all forms of private political activity, but encompasses only state-
regulated elections or elections conducted by organizations which
in practice produce "the uncontested choice of public offi-
cials., 2 6
This dictum is the clearest statement that our highest court has
made concerning the impact of Cousins on the state action ques-
tion. It implies, but does not hold, that elections are a public
function and nominations are not.
The federal circuits have been slow to find that nominations
are not a public function in the wake of Cousins and LaFollette.
In Ripon Society v. National Republican Party,269 a D.C. Circuit
en banc decision, the plurality opinion recognized that Cousins
- LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 122 (citations omitted).
Cousins, 419 U.S. at 483-84 n.4.
- 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
' Id. at 158 (citations omitted).
525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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undercut the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit's prior decisions that
selection of delegates to national conventions was state action.270
However, the court's opinion did not decide the state action ques-
tion. 271 Two well-reasoned concurrences went farther, however.
Judge Tamm's concurrence rejected the idea that national conven-
tions perform a public function. In discussing Cousins, Judge
Tamm noted that "[i]f the states cannot enforce the results of their
primaries, there is some question whether the acts of national
conventions should be considered those of states acting in con-
cert." 272 Judge Wilkey's concurrence also cited the effect of Cous-
ins on the public function argument, concluding that: "Feeble
indeed is the 'state function' which no state has the power to
control. Thus [Cousins] would seem to perish the claim that the
Republican National Convention's allocation of delegates is in any
way a 'state function.' "273
In Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Committee,274 the
court noted parenthetically that "[imn the earlier fifteenth amend-
ment cases, involving white-only primaries or other disenfranchise-
ment of blacks, the courts freely found the conduct of political
parties and groups to constitute state action. But recently, courts
have hesitated to find state action when, as in this case, racial
discrimination is not involved.' '275
Recently, in Kay v. New Hampshire Democratic Party,276 the
First Circuit found, in a case involving a Democratic presidential
candidate's forum, that, any attempt to characterize the forum as
state action would "confront" first amendment freedoms of polit-
ical parties, citing LaFollette.277
Trial courts have been bolder in assessing the consequences of
Cousins and LaFollette on the public function theory. In Martin-
Trigona v. Dunne,278 the court opined that slate-making for local
offices by Chicago's Democratic ward committeemen was consti-
tutionally-protected association, not state action, citing Cousins.279
270 Id. at 575.
"I Id. at 576.
17 Id. at 600 n.7 (Tamm, J., concurring).
23 Id. at 608-09 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
-' 719 F.2d 1072 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
21 Id. at 1077.
26 821 F.2d 31 (Ist Cir. 1987).
zn Id. at 33.
278 425 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
29 Id. at 814.
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In Hunt v. Democratic Party, the court concluded that party rules
governing state party committees were not state action, finding that
the first principle governing this type of case is that parties have
first amendment associational rights. 280 In Ferency v. Austin281 the
trial court deemed that the Michigan Democratic presidential cau-
cuses were not state action because the state could not constitu-
tionally tell the party how to select delegates to its national
convention. The court's ruling as to the Michigan caucuses was
reaffirmed in 1984 by Jackson v. Michigan State Democratic
Party,282 a district court case, and Ferency v. Secretary of State,283
a state appellate decision.
On the other hand, in Bachur v. Democratic National Party,
the district court determined that party rules for the selection of
national convention delegates in a state primary were state action. 284
The court found that, because the state was obliged to defer to
party rules, under LaFollette and Tashjian, the party became a
state institution. The court cited the classic exposition of the public
function theory in Rice.2 5 This revival of the public function theory
was short-lived, however, as the Fourth Circuit reversed the deci-
sion in Bachur.286 The appellate decision did not address the state
action issue, but held that the party's associational rights prevail
over the challenger's right to vote for the delegates of his or her
choice .287 Finally, in Heitmanis v. Austin, the court found that
because the party, not the state, has the final say on delegate
selection, delegate selection is not state action.28
To summarize, the trial courts have given Cousins and La-
Follette a practical construction. Barring a change in the law, it
appears that the public function theory does not apply to delegate
selection and party nomination proceedings generally.
b. State Regulation
The public function theory is not the sole basis on which
litigants have urged, and courts have found, party activity to be
M 439 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
21, 493 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1989), aff'd, 666 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1981).
m 593 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Mich 1984).
- 362 N.W.2d 743 (Mich. 1984).
2" 666 F. Supp. 763 (D. Md.), rev'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987).
21, See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
- Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 842.
u 677 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
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state action. Other factors include the extensive regulation of the
parties by statute, the preferential ballot access given to party
nominees, and federal financing to candidates and party conven-
tions. Each of these factors will be examined in turn, beginning
with the effect of state regulation.
Smith v. Allwright, one of the Texas White Primary Cases
discussed the effect of state statutory regulation on party activi-
ties.289 In finding that the Texas Democratic Party's exclusion of
blacks from its primaries was state action, the Court emphasized
the fact that nominations for state office were heavily regulated by
statute. The Court found that, "this statutory system for the
selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election
ballot makes the party which is required to follow these legislative
directions an agency of the state insofar as it determines the par-
ticipants in a primary election. ' '290
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in the 1962
case, Gray v. Sanders.291 The case concerned Georgia's use of a
county-unit system in state primary elections. This system required
that nominees receive a majority of county-unit votes, which were
not attributed so as to reflect the counties' population. As a result,
voters in the least populous county had ninety-nine times more
influence than voters in the most populous county. The Court
found that this system, which was mandated by statute, was state
action, holding that "state regulation of this preliminary phase of
the election process makes it state action.' '292
Although it might be plausible to read the Allwright and Gray
as authority for the proposition that regulation of party activities
could make those activities state action, it has since become clear
that regulation, in and of itself, does not convert private activity
into state action. The death knell for this theory came in the 1974
decision Metropolitan Edison.293 The Court held that the termina-
tion of electrical service by a heavily regulated private utility was
not state action simply because the utility was regulated. The Court
stated that
[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does
not by itself confer its action into that of the State for purposes
2" Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
m Id, at 663.
79 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
292 Id. at 374-75.
293 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [Neither] does the fact that
the regulation is extensive and detailed .... It may well be that
acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least something of a
governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found
to be internal "state" acts than will the acts of an entity lacking
these characteristics. But the inquiry must be whether there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the state itself.294
The effect of Metropolitan Edison on the prior cases holding
national party activity to be state action became apparent in the
1975 D.C. Circuit opinion in Ripon Society.295 Judge McGowan's
opinion for the court deliberately avoided deciding whether the
1976 Republican delegate allocation formula was state action. By
avoiding this issue Judge McGowan's opinion recognized that Met-
ropolitan Edison cast's serious doubt on the D.C. Circuit's earlier
holding in Georgia v. National Democratic Party296 and Bode v.
National Democratic Party2 97 that national party delegate allocation
formulas were state action. 298 Two of the concurring opinions in
the Ripon Society case were bolder. Judge Tamm read Metropoli-
tan Edison as holding that:
the mere fact that the state regulates some aspects of an organi-
zation does not make its activities state action .... There must
be a sufficient nexus between the challenged action and the state
regulation. Clearly no such nexus exists between any state statute
and the allocation of delegates to the Republican Convention. 299
Judge Tamm also found that federal regulations under the Federal
Election Campaign Act were also insufficient to trigger a finding
of state action.3°°
Judge Wilkey found that state regulation did not make either
the national convention or its delegate allocation formula state
action. Judge Wilkey's concurrence reasoned that because the for-
Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added).
29 525 F.2d 567.
- For a discussion of Georgia v. Nat'l Democratic Party, see supra notes 250-51 and
accompanying text.
"' For a discussion of Bode v. Nat'l Democratic Party, see supra note 252 and
accompanying text.
29 Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 574-75.
Id. at 599 (Tamm, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 601.
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mula was the product of party deliberations and was not compelled,
restricted, modified, devised, or encouraged by government, it was
not state action. 01
The Supreme Court's holding in Metropolitan Edison that reg-
ulated activities were not necessarily state action was reaffirmed in
the 1982 decisions Rendell-Baker v. Kohn 0 2 and Blum v. Yaret-
sky. 30
3
A 1986 district court case, California Republican Party v.
Mercier, followed these precedents 3 4 The defendant mailed state
cards that falsely represented themselves as official Republican
party endorsements. The state party sued under 42 U.S.C. section
1983, contending that because the defendant was masquerading as
the California Republican Party, he was acting under color of state
law. The court determined that the California Republican Party's
activities were not state action and, therefore, the defendant was
not acting under color of state law. 30 5 The court explained its
holding as follows:
The Party's theory on its Section 1983 claim is that Mercier was
masquerading as the California Republican party, and since the
California Republican party is heavily regulated, it is essentially
an entity of the state government .... [H]eavy state regulation
of private action does not turn that action into state action.
Though heavily regulated, the California Republican party is not
part of the state government, and its actions are not state ac-
tions.306
In conclusion, parties can no longer argue, and courts can no
longer decree, that state or federal regulation of the nomination
process in and of itself makes the various aspects of that process
state action. This is not to propose, however, that state or federal
regulation is irrelevant. Clearly, if a given party action is required
by state or federal law and the law is constitutional, then both the
law and the party's action would be subject to constitutional scru-
tiny as state action.
101 Id. at 606-07 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
- 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (regulation of private school does not make its personnel
decisions state action).
- 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (regulation of nursing homes does not make facility-
initiated discharges and transfers state action).
652 F. Supp. 928 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
303 California Republican Party v. Mercier, 652 F. Supp. 928, 933-34 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
Id. (citation omitted).
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c. Effect of Preferential Ballot Access
The election laws of most states provide automatic or prefer-
ential access to the ballot to the presidential nominees of major
parties. 07 Some courts and commentators have asserted that pref-
erential ballot access can make party nominations state action. This
argument has only appeared in the last two decades. It may have
been implicit in some of the Texas White Primary Cases, but none
of those cases actually referred to preferential ballot access as a
basis for concluding that party activities were state action.
The first reference to preferential ballot access occurs in 1941
in United States v. Classic.08 It must be remembered this is not a
state action case-it held that the federal government had the power
to proscribe corrupt practices in state-mandated primary elections
for federal office.3 9 The Court was careful to note the great
advantages that state law gave to official nominees, stating that
[i]n common with many other states Louisiana has exercised [its]
discretion by setting up machinery for the effective choice of
party candidates for representative in Congress by primary elec-
tions and by its laws it eliminates or seriously restricts the can-
didacy at the general election of all those who are defeated at the
primary. 10
In Allwright, one of the Texas White Primary Cases, the Court
again was at pains to describe how state law granted ballot pref-
erence to party nominees. 31' The Court majority made reference to
the fact that the parties certified candidates for inclusion on the
state ballot and to the fact that persons who were not so certified
could not appear on the general election ballot as party nominees.31 2
The Court further noted that independent or non-partisan candi-
dates could only be placed in nomination by qualified voters who
did not participate in party primaries for that office.31 3 The Court
summarized its reasoning as follows:
if the state requires a certain election procedure, prescribes a
general election ballot made up of party nominees so chosen and
- See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 660.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299.
m Id. at 318-20.
310 Id. at 311.
"1 321 U.S. 649. For a discussion of Allwright, see supra notes 237-38 and accompa-
nying text.
"I Id. at 663.
M Id. at 653.
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limits the choice of the electorate in general elections for state
offices, practically speaking, to those whose names appear on
such a ballot, it endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimination
against Negroes, practiced by a party entrusted by Texas law with
the determination of the qualifications of participants in the
primary. 14
The Court's decision did not turn solely on ballot access, but it is
one of several factors that led the Court to its decision. Later state
action decisions at the circuit level such as Rice and Baskin made
no explicit reference to ballot access as a factor in finding state
action. 315
In a spate of decisions preceding the 1972 party conventions
holding that delegate apportionment nor delegate selection was
state action, 316 there is a paucity of references to ballot access as a
factor. One intriguing and somewhat ambiguous exception is the
D.C. Circuit's 1971 decision in Georgia v. National Democratic
Party.31 7 Here, the court held that the parties' methods of appor-
tioning delegates to the states were state action:
The electorate's choice in a general election is effectively restricted
to the nominees of the two parties. By placing the nominees'
names on the ballot, the states, in effect, have adopted this
narrowing process as a necessary adjunct of their election pro-
cedures. Therefore, every step in the nominating process . . . is
as much a product of state action as if the states themselves were
collectively to conduct such primary conventions.3"'
The D.C. Circuit was clearly referring to state election laws
concerning ballot access. But the decision is devoid of analysis of
specific state statutes or of how those statutes benefit the national
parties. The Georgia decision relies on two rationales for finding
state action, the one quoted above and an earlier discussion that
seems to adopt the public function theory.319 In a subsequent case,
the D.C. Circuit expressed uncertainty as to whether its decision
114 Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
-' The reader will recall that these decisions read Allwright and Classic to hold that
party nominations were inherently state action, because nominating was a public function.
For a discussion of Rice, see supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of Baskin, see supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
316 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
317 447 F.2d 1271.
"' Id. at 1276.
See id. at 1275-76.
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in Georgia was based on preferential ballot access. In Ripon So-
ciety3 20 the plurality opinion avoided making a decision on the
state action question but noted that the intervening Supreme Court
cases of Metropolitan Edison,3 1 Moose Lodge #107 v. Irvis,322 and
Cousins cast doubt on its prior state action analysis. The court
discussed the ballot access factor in a footnote, writing that
even assuming that our finding of state action in Georgia rested
not on the power of the states to prove or disapprove the "nar-
rowing process" [which the court now found questionable in the
wake of Cousins] but merely on their support Of its outcome by
the placement of the candidate's name on the ballot, Moose
Lodge and [Metropolitan Edison] must still give us pause. Both
cases rejected claims of state action based on the award to the
defendants of a state benefit, which in the case of the power
licensed in [Metropolitan Edison], the court was prepared to
assume was a monopoly. 23
Here for the first time is an explicit discussion of the effect of
ballot access on a finding of state action, but it comes in a case
in which the plurality did not decide whether delegate allocation
formulas are state action.
Judge Tamm's concurrence in Ripon Society read the earlier
decision in Georgia as holding that the states made the party's
activities their own "through placing the party nominees' names
on the ballot."' 24 Judge Tamm found this analysis no longer ten-
able in light of Metropolitan Edison, noting that the nomination
function is not a traditional state function nor is the state interested
in the mechanics of the narrowing process so long as the size and
complexity of the ballot is within reason.3 25 Finally, Judge Tamm
made the following wise observations about preferential ballot
access:
If there is a Constitutional violation in these procedures, it is not
the certification, but the state's grant of automatic ballot access
to the major party's candidates. The remedy should not be to
interfere with the associational activities of the national parties,
'2 525 F.2d 567.
321 For a discussion of Metropolitan Edison, see supra notes 261-63 and accompanying
text.
3. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
2 Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 575 n.18.
14 Id. at 600 (Tamm, J., concurring).
32 Id. at 600-01 (Tamm, J., concurring). -
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but to deny their candidate the advantage in securing a place on
the state's ballot.3 26
Judge Wilkey's concurrence reached the same result. Judge
Wilkey read Georgia as holding that the party nominating process
was state action "because the states ratify the results of the con-
vention through the automatic placement of its nominees on the
general election ballot.' '327 Judge Wilkey, like Judge Tamm, rec-
ognized, in light of Metropolitan Edison and Cousins, that the fact
"that the states utilize the national party convention choices as the
party nominees to go on the ballot, instead of requiring a petition
or other device, does not retroactively transmute the national con-
vention nominating process into state action.' '328
The argument that preferential ballot access makes partisan
nominations state action was given new life in 1978 with the
publication of Professor Lawrence Tribe's authoritative text, Amer-
ican Constitutional Law. Professor Tribe devoted section 13-23 of
his book to discussion of state action problems in political party
activity. 329 He noted that there were at least three theories holding
that party activities are state action: the public function theory,
the existence of governmental regulation of the party nominating
process, and the granting of preferential ballot access. 30 Professor
Tribe described this third theory as follows:
The third, and most persuasive, basis for finding state action in
the behavior of political parties is that the state incorporates that
behavior into its political structure by granting preferential ballot
access to the nominees of political parties, thereby making party
nomination a kind of "feeder" into the state's official political
system. Every state grants access to the general election ballot to
the nominees of political parties that satisfy certain conditions,
conditions that typically differ from those that independent can-
didates must satisfy. In effect, therefore, the state delegates to
the political party the decidedly governmental function of deter-
mining who may gain a place on the ballot. Notwithstanding the
failure of the Supreme Court to formulate the governing princi-
ple, it thus seems clear that those actions of a political party
integrally involved in the selection of a candidate for public office
116 Id. at 601 n.9 (Tamm, J., concurring).
12, Id. at 606 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 607-08 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
319 L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CoNsTnuTioNAL LAW § 13-23 (Ist ed. 1978).
3" Id. at 790.
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should be treated as state action when the state incorporates the
party's choice by conferring some political benefit, such as pref-
erential ballot access, upon that candidate.3 3'
Other commentators have made the same point3 32 but the effect
of Professor Tribe's text was felt immediately in the 1978 Second
Circuit decision Montano v. Lefkowit. 3 33 The plaintiffs brought a
constitutional challenge to the method by which four New York
political parties chose nominees for a special election to a vacant
Congressional seat. Under New York law, each party could nom-
inate a candidate in whatever way its party rules prescribed. The
court reasoned that the party selection process was state action
because the state delegated this function to the parties under its
election law. 334 The court noted that Ripon Society, decided three
years earlier, questioned whether there was state action as regards
national political parties, but the court concluded in a footnote
that
whether or not the D.C. Circuit confirms such doubts to national
delegate selection rules, we join with "most commentators" and
"many lower courts" in holding that when the state grants polit-
ical parties the right to nominate candidates and then gives those
nominees special access to the ballot ... the parties' procedures
constitute state action.3 35
Most recently, in Bachur, a 1987 case involving voting rules
for a national convention, the district court took note of Professor
Tribe's argument. 336 The court noted that if Professor Tribe's test
was adopted, a Maryland Democratic Party rule requiring that
voters choose equal numbers of male and female delegates for the
3 1 Id.
332 See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HA~v. L. REv. 1111,
1158-59 (1975); Kester, Constitutional Restrictions on Political Parties, 60 VA. L. REv. 725,
766-67 (1974); Raymar, Judicial Review of Credentials Contests. The Experiences of the
1972 Democratic National Convention, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1973); Weisburd,
Candidate-Making and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraint on and Protection of
Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 213, 241-50 (1984); Note, Judicial Inter-
vention in National Political Conventions: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 59 CORNELL
L. REv. 107, 123-24 (1973); Comment, One Man, One Vote in Selection of Delegates to
National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 536-44 (1970); Comment, State
Action in Presidential Candidate Selection, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 1269, 1280-81, 1292 (1976).
333 575 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1978).
33, Id. at 383 n.7 (citing Tribe, supra note 329, at 788, 790) (emphasis added).
335 Id.
"1 Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l Party, 666 F. Supp. 763, 775 (D. Md. 1987).
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national convention would constitute state action because both
delegate candidates and presidential candidates received preferential
ballot access under state law.337 The Bachur court found, however,
that the Tribe formula had not been adopted by the Supreme
Court. 33 The district court decision in Bachur was later reversed
on other grounds. 3 9
It is difficult to assess the current status of the ballot access as
state action theory. As noted above, there is some support for it
in the case law, but the most recent case on the topic backs away
from it.34o There is little or no explicit support for it in the presi-
dential context before the decision in Ripon Society and that de-
cision did not adopt the theory.
In this author's opinion, the ballot access as state action theory
can no longer be applied to national conventions, given the parties'
substantial immunity from state law under the first amendment. It
would be anomalous in the extreme if a state that cannot control
the membership of its delegation to a national convention can,
nonetheless, retroactively render the national convention state ac-
tion by providing an unsought and unneeded advantage in access
to the general election ballot. Clearly, the national parties can meet
any constitutionally legitimate ballot access requirement. Automatic
ballot access is simply a bureaucratic shortcut for the national
parties. It is difficult to see why the existence or nonexistence of
such an unnecessary shortcut should have any impact on the state
action question.
More fundamentally, access to the ballot should not be viewed
as a privilege granted to the national parties. Access to the ballot
is a constitutional right that the states have only limited power to
regulate. This point was argued most forcefully in a 1984 article
by Professor Arthur M. Weisburd. 14 1 Professor Weisburd argues
that the Supreme Court has recognized that parties have a right of
access to the general election ballot if they have a reasonable degree
of popular support. 342 Because parties have a constitutional right
of access to the ballot, ballot access is not a privilege granted by
the state to the parties. In this author's opinion, the whole concept
"I7 Id. at 776.
339 Id.
3 See Bachur, 836 F.2d 837.
14 Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l Party, 666 F. Supp. at 776.
341 See Weisburd, supra note 332.
342 Id. at 242-44; see American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams, 393 U.S. 24.
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of ballot access as a privilege is inconsistent with the constitutional
rights of political parties and the practical reality that they do not
need any special favors to qualify for the ballot.
Finally, the ballot access as state action argument seems incon-
sistent with "nexus" requirements imposed by Metropolitan
Edison 43 and Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.344 Lugar sets forth a
two-step test for state action. The first step is that "the deprivation
must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created
by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a
person for whom the state is responsible. 3 45 The second part of
the test requires that "the party charged with the deprivation must
be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. '346
In regard to the first standard, the Lugar Court noted that it
was important to determine whether the policy at issue can "in
any way be ascribed to a governmental decision. 3 47 It would be
difficult to ascribe the decisions of a party credentials committee
or a national convention to a decision by the government to grant
ballot access in the general election.
Arguments that a national party's actions are state action would
face difficulties under the second part of the test as well because,
as the Court stated, "[a]ction by a private party pursuant to ...
statute, without something more, was not sufficient to justify a
characterization of that party as a 'state actor' ."348 Here again, if
all the government does is grant ballot access, it is difficult to find
any governmental involvement in specific decisions concerning who
may be a delegate, how the delegates are apportioned, and how
the national convention will operate in general. Lugar's and Met-
ropolitan Edison's focus on the nexus between the government and
the actual decision at issue is inconsistent with the notion that
simply granting ballot access will turn an earlier party action into
state action.
There is one potential exception to the analysis presented above
that could be of great significance in a presidential election. If a
national convention split, or an unsuccessful candidate bolted and
ran independently, the candidate who was not chosen by the na-
'4 See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
- 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
'A' Id. at 937.
w Id.
ml Id. at 938.
141 Id. (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, at 177 (1972)).
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tional convention could plausibly argue that the selection of his or
her opponent was state action. The Supreme Court has permitted
states to exclude unsuccessful candidates for party nomination from
the ballot. In Storer v. Brown, the Court held that a California
law that barred an individual affiliated with a party from running
for national office as an independent was constitutional. 49 The
Court found that the law furthered a compelling interest in the
stability of the political system by preventing independent candi-
dacies from bleeding support from major party candidates.
So long as Storer remains good law, a losing candidate in a
national convention could be barred from running for president by
state statutes recognizing the official nominee and barring others
who participated in the process from forming a new party or
running as independents. Such a candidate would have a very
strong argument that state law has delegated the right to exclude
candidates from the ballot to the national party. In this circum-
stance, there would be a nexus between state law and the depri-
vation suffered by the disappointed candidate.
In 1980, the Republican Party suffered this type of split. John
Anderson, a Republican member of Congress and a candidate for
the 1980 Republican presidential nomination, bolted the party and
ran as an independent candidate for president. He was placed on
the ballot in virtually every state. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
a decision that excluded Anderson from the Ohio ballot because
he did not file his nominating petition in March of 1980, prior to
the time when Ronald Reagan clinched the Republican nomina-
tion.35 0 Thus, in the most recent actual test, the Supreme Court
did not uphold state laws excluding a disappointed nomination
candidate from running as an independent.
This controversy was foreseen by Judge Tamm in his concur-
rence in Ripon Society, which is quoted above. Judge Tamm
properly concluded that rather than interfere with the associational
activities of the national parties by imposing constitutional stan-
dards, the courts should deny the parties' candidates any advan-
tages in securing a place on a state ballot.351 By extension, the
proper solution where a candidate bolts the party is not to subject
the party decision to constitutional scrutiny, but rather to find
' 415 U.S. 724 (1974). See also Davis v. State Election Bd. of Okla., 762 P.2d 932,
935 (Okla. 1988).
310 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 567 n.9 (Tamm, J., concurring).
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unconstitutional those statutes that prohibit the candidate from
appearing as an independent or under his own party label. This
could entail overruling Storer.35 2
d. Effect of Public Financing
A new factor that emerged in recent years is the federal fi-
nancing of national conventions and presidential nomination cam-
paigns. The effect of public financing on the state action issue was
first discussed, as were so many other issues, in Ripon Society.
The plurality opinion mentioned 1974 legislation providing federal
financing of presidential nominating conventions, national com-
mittees, and primary campaigns.35 3 The court stated in dictum that
"if the parties' conventions, and their candidates, are to be so far
underwritten by the federal government, then perhaps they must
share its Constitutional obligations. '3 5 4 Judge Tamm's concurrence
also recognized the importance of federal funding but concluded
that "absent a finding of racial discrimination, the mere receipt of
government funds is not enough to dictate [a finding of state
action]. ' 35 5 Judge Wilkey's concurrence came to the same conclu-
sion. 356
Judge Tamm's and Judge Wilkey's reasoning found support
after the fact in Rendell-Baker357 and Blum.358 Rendell-Baker held
that there was no state action in the decision of a privately operated
school to terminate an employees despite the fact that virtually all
the school's income was derived from government funding. 3 9 Sim-
ilarly, in Blum, the court held that decisions made by physicians
and nursing home administrators were not state action despite the
fact that the private nursing home involved received more than
ninety percent of its funding from the government. 360
Despite these decisions, two subsequent cases have, probably
erroneously, relied on public financing of presidential nomination
campaigns as a significant factor supporting a finding of state
352 See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
M Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 576.
354 Id.
31 Id. at 601 (Tamm, J., concurring).
3M Id. at 608 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
3" Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (White, J., concurring).
31, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
M' Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 844.
-0 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011.
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action. In Bachur,36' the district court's highly idiosyncratic opinion
(later reversed on other grounds) found that the federal financing
of presidential nominating conventions meant that the national
party received significant aid from government officials and there-
fore met the state action tests set forth in Lugar. 62 In a very
different context, the Third Circuit found in Ammond v. McGahn
that the decisions of the Democratic caucus of the New Jersey
state senate were state action because the caucus' sessions were
conducted in the state house, on state property, were serviced by
state paid employees, and because notices of the caucus' meetings
were paid foT by the state.36 3 A better reasoned decision to the
contrary is Mercier, finding that state provisions of tax preferences
and discount mailing rates to a person sending out political mailings
did not turn his or her actions into state action. 364
Despite some recent authority to the contrary, it seems clear
that public financing of primary campaigns and national cam-
paigns, in and of itself, does not turn the national parties' nomi-
nating process into state action. This is not to say, however, that,
in an individual case, party decisions concerning how to spend
public funds or governmental decisions concerning who is to receive
the money and how it is to be spent could not be challenged on
constitutional grounds. For purposes of this Article, however, it is
concluded that public financing is mostly a "red herring" that
should not mislead courts into thinking that party activity is state
action.
e. State Action and Racial Discrimination
In the discussion above of political parties' first amendment
rights, it was noted that first amendment protection of associational
rights may be lessened where there is racial or sexual discrimina-
tion. Conversely there is also some authority for the proposition
that state action may be defined more broadly where there is a
discriminatory exclusion from party activities.
The Ripon Society opinions stated in dictum that in cases of
overt racial discrimination, a lesser degree of governmental involve-
ment may trigger constitutional scrutiny. 365 Similarly, in Flagg
36 Bachur, 666 F. Supp. 763.
362 Id. at 777.
363 532 F.2d 325, 327 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1976).
"6 Mercier, 652 F. Supp. at 934.
365 See Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 589 (McKinnon, J., plurality opinion); id. at 602
(Tamm, J., concurring); id. at 606 n.10 ('Wilkey, J., concurring).
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Brothers, the Supreme Court noted in dictum that special consid-
eration may be appropriate under the public function theory in
cases involving racial restrictions on voting rights.3 66
The distinction between cases involving racial discrimination
and other cases was also noted in Wymbs, a case involving selection
of delegates to national conventions.3 67 The Court stated that
[i]n the earlier fifteenth amendment cases, involving the white-
only primaries or other disenfranchisement of blacks, the courts
freely found the conduct of political parties and groups to con-
stitute state action. But recently, courts have hesitated to find
state action when, as in this case, racial discrimination is not
involved. 68
Thus, in the unlikely event that a major party adopts a racially
exclusive policy, actions that would otherwise be considered private
and protected by the first amendment could be invalidated as
violative of equal protection. A party that adopted a racially ex-
clusionary policy could hardly claim surprise; Terry shows that
even unsubsidized and unofficial party activities that exclude a
racial minority may be treated as state action.3 69 Separate treatment
of racial exclusion for state action purposes may appear to be
"result-oriented," but it is consistent with the purpose behind the
adoption of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. These
amendments were specifically intended to eliminate governmental
racism, so perhaps their scope should be broader when necessary
to achieve this purpose.
D. A Proposal for an Associational Rights-Based Analysis
Throughout the long, tangled history of legal challenges to
partisan presidential nominating procedures, there are two contra-
dictory tendencies that have produced a somewhat schizophrenic
body of law. The first, and strongest, tendency is to give political
parties substantial autonomy from judicial review. The second
tendency is the courts' unwillingness to allow political parties to
engage in especially flagrant violations of voting rights, particularly
in cases involving overt racial discrimination.
'6 436 U.S. at 158 n.7.
367 Wymbs v. Republican State Exec. Comm., 719 F.2d 1072 (lth Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
'" Id. at 1077; see also Heitmanis v. Austin, 677 F. Supp. 1347, 1358 (E.D. Mich.
1988).
30 See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
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Although the tendency to grant the parties autonomy has gen-
erally prevailed, nonetheless, the cases have presented a theoretical
muddle because until 1975 there had not been a simple, understand-
able theory to support the courts' reluctance to intervene in party
affairs. Prior to the recognition of associational rights concerns in
Cousins and LaFollette,370 the courts turned to the clearly inappli-
cable political question doctrine to avoid intruding into party af-
fairs. On the other hand, the courts, seeing no limit on the reach
of state action, had declared virtually every aspect of the presiden-
tial nomination process to be state action. The courts had given
themselves license to review party affairs but seemingly lacked the
will to actually do so. The recognition of associational rights should
have dramatically changed the situation, but the courts have con-
tinued to issue confusing rulings or non-rulings on the justiciability
and state action issues.
In this author's opinion, the way out of this muddle is to begin
the legal analysis by giving primary emphasis to the first amend-
ment associational rights of national political parties. It is already
well-established that national conventions themselves, as well as
their local delegate selection processes, are largely immune from
state regulation. If a case ever arises, the Supreme Court will
probably find that national parties have a constitutional immunity
from many forms of federal regulation as well, based on Tashjian
and Eu.371 Although no Supreme Court case has yet recognized it,
it seems inevitable that the courts will ultimately conclude that
there is no state action regarding party activities that are protected.
by the first amendment.
Admittedly, the relationship between first amendment protec-
tions and state action could be argued the other way around. While
this author argues that the first amendment requires that federal
courts not intervene in party activities that the legislative branch
could not constitutionally regulate under the first amendment,
nonetheless, the argument could be inverted. One could logically
argue that parties that nominate candidates engage in state action
and thereby waive their first amendment rights to some extent.
When constitutional values clash, the time-honored method of
resolving such conflicts is to engage in the mysterious process of
"weighing" the values at stake. While this process is not always
intellectually satisfying, it may be an appropriate way to resolve
310 See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
37 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 78
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS AND THE LAW
the conflict between first amendment associational rights and the
myriad of other constitutional rights protected by a finding of state
action. If one applies a balancing approach, the arguments for
party autonomy clearly outweigh the arguments for finding that
there is state action. The right of national political parties to
establish membership requirements, delegate selection rules, and
procedural rules governing the national convention is clearly at the
heart of those values protected by the first amendment. 372
No organization is more powerful or more important in peti-
tioning the government for the redress of grievances or expressing
political ideas than a political party. This fundamental fact has
always undergirded the court's reluctance to intervene in party
affairs. In Cousins, LaFollette, Tashjian and Eu, the Supreme
Court established the conceptual basis for recognizing party auton-
omy as a fundamental first amendment value.
By contrast, state action questions involving national parties
are inherently not at the core of the values protected by the various
constitutional provisions. When one attacks the decisions of party
committees that set delegate selection and apportionment rules, or
that decide which delegates will be seated and which shall be
excluded, clearly one is on the periphery of what might be consid-
ered government action. The first amendment versus state action
issue comes up in precisely those cases in which state action is least
obvious and associational rights most important. The cases that
pose state action issues are the ones where it is least clear that the
constitutional protections being asserted were ever intended to ap-
ply to the conduct at issue.
Currently, no court 373 or commentator has ever engaged in the
balancing process described above. This approach, however, does
have a place within the canonical authorities of both case law and
learned commentary.
The Supreme Court has from time to time recognized that in
enforcing constitutional restraints on government, it must also be
sensitive to potential conflicts with other constitutional values.
Thus, for example, in Marsh v. Alabama, where the issue was
372 See, e.g., Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 15; FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1985); In re Grand Jury
Proceeding, 842 F.2d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 1988); Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1495.
-3 Cf. Delgado, 861 F.2d 1497-98 (holding that circulation of initiative petitions was
not state action because it was constitutionally protected activity); Martin-Trigona, 435
N.W.2d at 745 (finding that nomination proceedings involved private matters, not public
questions).
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whether first amendment activities could be banned on the premises
of a company-owned town, the Court acknowledged the existence
of a conflict between the property rights of the- landowner and the
first amendment rights of the plaintiffs. 74 It held that the first
amendment should prevail. Similarly, in Gilmore v. City of Mont-
gomery, the Supreme Court recognized the danger that an over-
broad application of fourteenth amendment rights could threaten
freedom of association. 37- The appellate court found that the gov-
ernment may not grant exclusive use of a public facility to a racially
segregated group. 76 The Supreme Court noted, however, that "any
denial of access must withstand close scrutiny and be carefully
circumscribed" in order to protect associational rights. 377 Finally,
some commentators advocate the use of a balancing test to decide
state action issues. 378
The use of a balancing approach finds some support in Pro-
fessor Tribe's treatise. Professor Tribe argues that in deciding state
action issues, there are two possible starting points. One view finds
that state action "exists in a Constitutional universe that includes
a developed conception of individual liberty which serves to limit
the scope of possible government action. ' 379 By recognizing that
individual liberty exists before the state action determination is
made, this viewpoint clearly implies that state action cannot be
found in those areas protected by the first amendment. Professor
Tribe notes that it is much easier to develop a coherent theory of
state action under this theory than under an alternative theory
recognizing liberty only where the government chooses not to act.3 10
The consequence of adopting the first amendment as a touch-
stone for both associational rights and state action issues is to
greatly simplify legal analysis. The vast majority of state action
questions can be resolved by the simple expedient of examining
what and whose actions are being challenged. Thus, for example,
if one's challenge is directed at the legitimacy, interpretation, or
application of federal statutes concerning campaign finance, or if
it is directed at state election laws, both the function involved and
3- 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
-5 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
116 Id. at 566.
I" Id. at 575.
171 See R. RoTuNDA, S. NowAK & S. YoUNm, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
Substance and Procedure, § 16.5.
I" L. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTTUTONAL LAW, § 18-2, p. 1691 (2nd ed. 1988).
310 Id. at 1692.
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the actor involved are clearly governmental. If, on the other hand,
one is challenging a formula for allocating delegates or a party
decision on credentials or eligibility for participation in caicuses
or primaries, one is seeking review of the actions of a party actor.
While there is an infinite number of permutations and possibilities
of hybrid state-party action, if first amendment values are recog-
nized as paramount, most state action decisions could be resolved
by answering a simple question: whose decision is being challenged,
that of the state or that of the party?
The theory suggested above allows, as well, a revival of the
public function theory as a basis for state action decisions. The
actions that are public functions, i.e., ballot access laws, the op-
eration of primary elections, the selection of presidential electors,
and the provision of public financing to political parties, are subject
to constitutional attack. On the other hand, those functions that
are essentially partisan in nature, including the internal law of the
national convention, the decision as to how delegates are to be
selected, and the actual nomination itself, are first amendment
activities and should not directly or indirectly come under judicial
scrutiny as state action.
The theory suggested above is fully consistent with the Texas
White Primary Cases. Allwright held that primary elections were
state action and there is no reason to depart from this holding. 38'
To the extent a party uses state election machinery to select its
national convention delegates, it has deliberately sought the impri-
matur of the government and must permit constitutional challenges
to the manner in which the primary is held. On the other hand,
the weight given to the primary, if any, in the party selection
process is within the bounds of the associational rights of the party
and a party is not required to pay attention to the results of
primaries that violate its own rules.
The more expansive ruling in Terry is also consistent with an
associational rights-based analysis.3 12 In Terry, the majority of the
justices found that the decision of the Jaybird Democratic Asso-
ciation was the only election that mattered and that its procedure
was adopted for the explicit purpose of evading constitutional
restrictions. Under these extreme circumstances of party monopoly
and of the intentional replacement of state mandated election pro-
cedures with a purportedly private proceeding, the balance shifts
381 See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
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in favor of a finding of state action since a core right (the right
to participate in the political process on an equal basis) has been
totally eliminated. To limit this case to its facts involves some
confusion of theory because the justices did not agree on which
facts were dispositive. However, since it is unlikely that the extreme
facts involved in Terry will recur at the national level in the
foreseeable future, it is the type of problem that can probably be
ignored by the courts.
Any solution to the vexing problem of the constitutional role
of national party conventions involves trade-offs of some sort. The
clarity of and respect for first amendment rights that will be
achieved by continuing to recognize first amendment autonomy
and by interpreting state action accordingly also involves the cre-
ation of a potential new area of contest. If the courts persist in
deferring to party decisions, at some point the field of battle will
switch from the constitutional and statutory arena to the arena of
the law of internal party affairs. If the states and the federal
government must defer to party decisions, the question remains as
to who speaks for the party.
National conventions and national party committees have rules,
just as other nonprofit organizations have rules. The courts would
not hesitate to enforce the bylaws or articles of incorporation of a
foundation, charity, or university if a dispute arose involving those
rules. Just as the loser in a fight for control of a charitable trust
would turn to the courts for an interpretation of the trust instru-
ment and review of the actions of the trustees, so might a spurned
candidate for the party nomination turn to the courts for review
of decisions of the rules committee or for review of rulings from
the chair at the national convention. The issue would be decided
not on constitutional grounds, but on the basis that the candidate's
rights under the internal law of the organization had been violated.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to predict how such
challenges will be dealt with. It is worth noting that a similar
problem arises when schisms occur in religious organizations. Def-
erence to private decisions is a simple and proper solution to the
vast majority of intra-party or intra-religious disputes, but some-
times a dispute involves a more fundamental issue going to the
very identity of the organization. We must recognize that if a party
is a constitutionally protected private organization whose internal
decisions ordinarily cannot be regulated by the government and do
not constitute state action, nonetheless, we have not solved all the
legal problems posed by challenges to party action. There will
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always be some basis for legal attack on the presidential nomination
process. But if we give primary emphasis to the parties' constitu-
tional right to operate according to rules of their own choosing,
we turn the focus of the analysis where it belongs, viz., on the
parties' own rules, and avoid the theoretical quagmire of deciding
state action and justiciability questions in every case.

